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Abstract
This paper provides a quantitative analysis of gains from trade in a model with
head-to-head competition using Chinese firm-level data from Economic Censuses in
1995 and 2004. We find a significant reduction in trade cost during this period, and
total gains from such improved openness during this period is 7:1%. The gains are
decomposed into a Ricardian component and two pro-competitive ones. The pro-
competitive effects account for 20% of the total gains. Moreover, the total gains from
trade are 13  31% larger than what would result from the formula provided by ACR
(Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare 2012), which nests a class of important
trade models, but without pro-competitive effects. We find that head-to-head com-
petition is the key reason behind the larger gains, as trade flows do not reflect all of
the effects via markups in an event of trade liberalization. One methodological advan-
tage of this paper’s quantitative framework is that its application is not constrained
by industrial or product classifications; thus it can be applied to countries of any size.
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1 Introduction
It has been well understood that competition may affect gains from trade via changes in
the distribution of markups. For example, when markups are the same across all goods,
first-best allocative efficiency is attained because the condition that the price ratio equals
the marginal cost ratio, for any pair of goods, holds. In other words, in an economy with
variable markups, trade liberalization may improve allocative efficiency if the dispersion
of markups is reduced.1 Moreover, the relative markup effect also matters because welfare
improves with trade liberalization when consumers benefit from lower markups of the
goods they consume and when producers gain from higher markups (hence higher prof-
its) in foreign markets. The effects of trade liberalization via changes in both the mean
and dispersion of markups are generally termed pro-competitive effects of trade.
A natural question is then whether competition and markups are quantitatively impor-
tant in gains from trade. To address this, this paper conducts quantitative analyses of
the gains from trade using a model that features head-to-head competition to investigate
the role of pro-competitive effects. We use Chinese firm-level data in Economic Cen-
suses in 1995 and 2004 to quantify our model. China in between these two years is an
important case, as this was a period when China drastically improved openness – not
only was transport infrastructure rapidly expanded, but joining the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) in 2001 also drastically reduced trade barriers.2 Recently, Brandt, Van
Biesebroeck, Wang, and Zhang (2012) and Lu and Yu (2015) have both estimated firm-
level markups using Chinese manufacturing data and the approach by De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012; henceforth DLW). Lu and Yu (2015) show that the larger the tariff re-
duction due to the WTO entry in one industry, the greater the reduction in the dispersion
of markups in that industry. Brandt et al. present similar results on levels of markups.
These empirical results suggest that pro-competitive effects might be present in the case
of China, but a formal quantitative welfare analysis is warranted.
The two focuses of our welfare analyses are how head-to-head competition matters
for the total gains from trade and the decomposition of these total gains into a standard
Ricardian component and pro-competitive effects. To appreciate what we do, it is im-
portant to review recent related studies. First, Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare
(2012; henceforth ACR) show that for a class of influential trade models, welfare gains
from trade (cW  W 0=W ) can be simply calculated by (v0=v)1= = v^1=, where v is domes-
1The idea of allocative efficiency dates back to Robinson (1934, Ch. 27) and Lipsey et al. (1956-57).
2Between 1995 and 2004, the import share increased from 0:13 to 0:22, whereas the export share increased
from 0:15 to 0:25. The proportion of exporters among manufacturing firms also increased from 4:4% to
10:5%.
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tic expenditure share, and  < 0 is the trade elasticity. As both v and  depend on trade
flows, trade flows provide key information regarding gains from trade. However, this
class of models features no pro-competitive effects. To investigate pro-competitive effects,
Edmond, Midgrigan, and Xu (2015; henceforth EMX) use a model of distinct-product
Cournot competition a lá Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and find that pro-competitive ef-
fects account for 11  38% of total gains from trade. Moreover, even though EMX’s model
deviates from the ACR class and sizable pro-competitive effects are found, it turns out
their total gains from trade is well captured by the local version of the ACR formula. Sim-
ilar results are also found by Feenstra and Weinstein (2016). Whereas ACR (p. 116) state,
“While the introduction of these pro-competitive effects, which falls outside the scope of
the present paper, would undoubtedly affect the composition of the gains from trade, our
formal analysis is a careful reminder that it may not affect their total size”, the present
paper will revisit both the total and composition of gains from trade, and show how head-
to-head competition matters.
Our quantitative framework is a variant of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003;
henceforth BEJK). To understand our framework, we first note three features of BEJK.
First, the productivity of firms is heterogeneous and follows a Fréchet distribution. Sec-
ond, firms compete in Bertrand fashion good by good and market by market with active
firms charging prices at the second lowest marginal costs. Third, although differences in
markups are driven by productivity differences through limit pricing, it turns out that
the resulting markup distribution is invariant to trade costs. Holmes, Hsu, and Lee (2014)
find that this invariance is due to the assumption that the productivity distribution is
fat-tailed (Fréchet). If productivity draws are from a non-fat-tailed distribution, then the
distribution of markups may change with the trade cost, and pro-competitive effects of
trade may be observed.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of markups in China in 1995 and 2004. The distribu-
tions are highly skewed to the right, and it is clear that the distribution in 2004 is more
condensed than that in 1995. Indeed, the (unweighted) mean markup decreases from
1:43 to 1:37 and almost all percentiles decrease from 1995 to 2004 (See Section 3 for more
details). A two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test clearly rejects the null hypothesis that
the two samples (1995 and 2004) are drawn from the same distribution.3 Under the BEJK
structure, this suggests that one needs to deviate from fat-tailed distributions to account
for such changes.4
3The combined K-S is 0:0829 and the p-value is 0:000.
4Similarly, Feenstra (2014) find that in monopolistic competition models, pro-competitive effects do not
exist under Pareto productivity distribution, but they reappear when the distribution deviates from Pareto.
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We thus adopt the model of Holmes et al. (2014) with the productivity drawn from
log-normal distributions. The log-normal distribution has been widely used in empirical
applications; in particular, Head, Mayer, and Thoenig (2014) argue that log-normal dis-
tribution offers a better approximation to firm sizes than Pareto. We describe the model
in detail in Section 2. In Section 3, we structurally estimate the model using Simulated
Method of Moments (SMM) in each data year, as if we are taking snapshots of the Chi-
nese economy in the respective years. Thus, all parameters are allowed to change be-
tween these two years to reflect changes in the environment of the Chinese economy. In
our main quantitative exercise, we vary only the trade cost. In particular, we gauge the
effect of “factual improvement in openness” by examining the effect of changing trade
costs from 1995 to 2004. As we focus on competition, our empirical implementation re-
lies heavily on markups. We estimate firm-level markups following DLW and then use
moments of markups to discipline model parameters, along with some macro moments.
In Section 4, we conduct welfare analysis on gains from trade. Our benchmark counter-
factual analysis is based on 2004 estimates and reverts the trade cost back to the level
estimated using 1995 data to gauge the gains from the improved openness in this period.
The gain is 7:1% of real income, and the contribution of the pro-competitive effects is
19:9%. The improvement of allocative efficiency accounts for the bulk of pro-competitive
effects. The overall gains at 7:1% seems a relatively large number compared with those
found in the literature. The sources of the larger gains compared with the literature can
be understood as three-fold. First, there is a large reduction in trade cost (from an iceberg
cost of 2:31 to 1:78) that is essentially inferred by the large increase in trade flows during
1995–2004. For a given trade elasticity , this implies large gains by the ACR formula, ascW = v^1= and v^ here is small.
Second, Simonovska and Waugh (2014b) and Melitz and Redding (2015) argue that
new trade models with micro mechanisms such as firm heterogeneity, selection, variable
markup, etc, imply lower estimates of absolute value of trade elasticity jj. By accounting
for markup dispersion in the data, our quantification also entails smaller jj,5 which hov-
ers around 3. As the trade elasticity is a variable in our model, we calculate the gains by
the ACR formula by integrating the local formula, and we obtain 5:9%. The gains by the
ACR formula would be 3:3% with a standard estimate of jj = 5.6 Thus, the difference in
trade elasticity is the second source of the larger gains.
The total gains from trade in our model are 20%(= 7:1=5:9   1) larger than the ACR
formula, and we investigate the reasoning behind this third source of larger gains. We
5For the intuition behind the low trade elasticities in our estimated models, see Section 4.2.
6See Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) for a discussion on the standard estimates.
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prove that the extra gains come precisely from the pro-competitive effects in the special
case of Cobb-Douglas preference. Under general CES preference, pro-competitive effects
may be smaller or larger than the extra gains, but they are still quite close. The intuition is
that trade flows do not fully reflect changes in markups in this model with head-to-head
competition among firms. For example, a domestic firm may charge a lower price in the
face of fiercer foreign competition, but precisely because of the lower price, foreign com-
petitors do not enter, and no trade flows are generated due to this change in markup (See
Salvo (2010) and Schmitz (2005) for empirical examples). In contrast, in either monopo-
listic competition models (such as Arkolakis et al. (2018), Feenstra et al. (2016) and many
others)7 or distinct-product Bertrand or Cournot competition models (such as EMX), each
firm owns a variety and hence a demand curve along which pricing is determined. A
change in trade cost shifts firms’ demand curves through general equilibrium effects or
strategic interactions and thus affects markups and trade flows simultaneously. This is
not the case here with head-to-head competition.
In Section 5, we extend the model to a multi-sector economy to account for hetero-
geneity across sectors. The welfare results in the multi-sector economy remain similar to
the one-sector economy. Exploiting the variations in sectoral markups and trade costs,
we also attempt to answer the question of whether China liberalized the “right” sectors
in terms of reduction in trade cost or tariffs. The rationale is that the overall allocative
efficiency would be better improved if the government were to target its trade liberal-
ization more in the higher-markup sectors because this would reduce the dispersion of
markups across sectors. We find that when a sectoral markup was higher in 1995, there
was a tendency for a larger reduction in the estimated trade cost or import tariff between
1995 and 2004.
A desirable feature of our oligopolistic framework for quantitative analyses with micro-
level data is that it is applicable to countries of any size. To illustrate this point, take the
closely related work by EMX, which has a sensible feature that links markups with firms’
market shares. Their model is quantified using Taiwanese firm-level data, which works
well for their oligopoly environment because they can go down to a very fine product
level to look at a few firms to examine their market shares. However, it could be diffi-
cult to apply their framework to a large economy (such as the US or China) where even
in the finest level of industry or product, there could be hundreds of firms, to the ef-
fect that firms’ market shares are typically much smaller than those for a small country.
7There is an extensive literature exploring properties of markups under monopolistic competition; see,
for example, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Krugman (1979), Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008), Behrens and Murata (2012), Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse (2012), Feenstra
(2014), Weinberg (2015), Feenstra and Weinstein (2016), and Dhingra and Morrow (2016).
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The problem here is that when firms’ market shares are “diluted” by country size for a
given industry or product category, so are pro-competitive effects. This is not to say that
pro-competitive effects do not exist in large countries; rather, it may be that there are ac-
tually several markets in an industry or product category, but we simply do not know
how to separate them. In contrast, markups in our model are driven by the difference
between the active firms and their latent competitors, and thus they are not tied to any
given product or industrial classification. Our approach is therefore applicable to data
from countries of any size.
Besides the above-mentioned studies, earlier theoretical work on how trade may af-
fect welfare through markups include Markusen (1981), Devereux and Lee (2001), and
Epifani and Gancia (2011). In particular, Markusen (1981) shows that in an environment
with head-to-head Cournot competition and symmetric countries, trade can reduce markup
dispersion and thus enhance welfare without generating trade flows. Our work differs
in that we provide quantitative analyses with a richer markup-generating mechanism
and by linking to the ACR formula. Whereas our model follows that in Holmes et al.
(2014), our work differs in at least three aspects: (1) we quantify pro-competitive effects
with Chinese data; (2) we provide theoretical and quantitative analyses on the link to
the ACR formula and show that head-to-head competition adds extra gains; (3) we use
multi-sector analysis to show how cross-sector markup dispersion matters.
In a monopolistic-competition framework, Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodríguez-
Clare (2018) study a class of models that allows a general preference and variable markups,
and find that the total welfare gains in these models are slightly lower than those with
constant markups. In this sense, they conclude that the pro-competitive effects of trade
are elusive. Nevertheless, this approach of comparing across models is a different exer-
cise from our welfare decomposition within the same model and from our comparison
with the ACR formula. Hence, their exercises are not directly comparable with ours.
Our work is closely related to recent studies regarding how gains from trade are re-
lated to the ACR formula. By using both data on trade flows and micro-level prices,
Simonovska and Waugh (2014b) show that welfare gains from trade in new models with
micro-level margins exceed those in frameworks without these margins. Interestingly,
even though our trade elasticity is a variable, our local trade elasticities at the estimated
models are quite close to their estimates of trade elasticity under the BEJK model. Our
work differs by incorporating pro-competitive effects and showing that the total gains
from trade can deviate from the ACR formula in the BEJK framework once the productiv-
ity draws deviate from Fréchet. Melitz and Redding (2015) show that the trade elasticity
becomes variable when the distribution of productivity deviates from untruncated Pareto
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in the Melitz (2003) framework, and hence the global ACR formula does not apply. Obvi-
ously, their mechanism is different from ours.8
Our work is also related to de Blas and Russ (2012) and De Loecker, Goldberg, Khan-
delwal, and Pavcnik (2016), who provide analyses of how trade affects the distribution of
markup. But these papers do not address welfare gains from trade. By looking at alloca-
tive efficiency, our paper is also broadly related to the literature of resource misallocation,
including Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Recently, As-
turias et al. (2017) has studied the welfare effect of transportation infrastructure in India
and examined the role of allocative efficiency in a similar fashion to Holmes et al. (2014)
and the current paper.
2 Model
2.1 Consumption and Production
There are two countries, which are indexed by i = 1; 2.9 In our empirical application, 1
means China, and 2 means the ROW. As is standard in the literature of trade, we assume
a single factor of production, labor, that is inelastically supplied, and the labor force in
each country is denoted as Li. There is a continuum of goods with measure , and the
utility function of a representative consumer is
Q =
Z !
0
(q!)
 1
 d!
 
 1
for   1,
where q! is the consumption of good !,  is the elasticity of substitution, and !   is
the measure of goods that are actually produced. We will specify how ! is determined
shortly. The standard price index is
Pj 
Z !
0
p1 j! d!
 1
1 
. (1)
8Other recent studies on gains from trade via different angles from the ACR finding include at least
Caliendo and Parro (2015) on the roles of intermediate goods and sectoral linkages; Fajgelbaum and Khan-
delwal (2016) on the differential effects of trade liberalization on consumers with different income; and di
Giovanni, Levchenko, and Zhang (2014) and Hsieh and Ossa (2016) on the global welfare impact of China’s
trade integration and productivity growth. Our work differs in that we focus on the pro-competitive effects.
9Since Eaton and Kortum (2002), quantitative analysis of trade in a multiple-country framework has
become computationally tractable and widely applied. See, for examples, Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and
Caliendo and Parro (2015), among many others. Nevertheless, as our study focuses on the distribution of
markups and relies on firm-level data, we cannot use a multiple-country framework because we do not
have access to firm-level data in multiple countries.
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Total revenue in country i is denoted as Ri, which also equals the total income. Welfare
of country i’s representative consumer is therefore Ri=Pi, which can also be interpreted
as real GDP. The quantity demanded (qj!) and expenditure (Ej!) for the product ! in
country j are given by
qj! = Qj

pj!
Pj
 
;
Ej! = Rj

pj!
Pj
1 
: (2)
For each good !, there are n! number of potential firms. Production technology is
constant returns to scale, and for a firm k located at i, the quantity produced is given by
q!;ik = '!;ik`!;ik;
where '!;ik is the Hicks-neutral productivity of firm k 2 f1; 2; :::; n!;ig, n!;i is the number
of entrants in country i for good !, and `!;ik is the amount of labor employed. Note the
subtle and important difference between subscript j! and !; i. The former means that it
is the purchase of ! by consumers at location j, and the latter is the sales or production
characteristics of the firm located at i producing !.
2.2 Measure of Goods and Number of Entrants
The number of entrants for each good ! 2 [0; ] in each country i is a random realization
from a Poisson distribution with mean i. That is, the density function is given by
fi (n) =
e ini
n!
:
Poisson parameters provide a parsimonious way to summarize the overall competitive
pressure (or entry effort) in the economy.10 The total number of entrants for good ! across
the two countries is n! = n!;1 + n!;2. There are goods that have no firms from either
countries, and the total number of goods actually produced is given by
! =  [1  f1 (0) f2 (0)] = 

1  e (1+2) : (3)
10Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo (2013) also model finite number of firms as a Poisson random variable, but
for a very different purpose.
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There is also a subset of goods produced by only one firm in the world, and in this case,
this firm charges monopoly prices in both countries. For the rest, the number of entrants
in the world are at least two, and firms engage in Bertrand competition. We do not model
entry explicitly. By this probabilistic formulation, we let i summarize the entry effort in
each country. From (3), we see that the larger the mean numbers of firms i, the larger the
!.
2.3 Productivity, Trade Cost, Pricing and Markups
Let wages be denoted as wi. If the productivity of a firm is 'i!, then its marginal cost
is wi='i! before any delivery. Assume standard iceberg trade costs  ij  1 (to deliver
one unit to j from i, it must ship  ij units). Let  ii = 1 for all i. Hence, for input !, the
delivered marginal cost from country i’s firm k to country j is therefore  ijwi
'!;ik
. For each
i!, productivity '!;ik is drawn from log-normal distribution, i.e., ln'!;ik is distributed
normally with mean i and variance 2i . Let '!;i and '!;i be the first and second highest
productivity draws among the ni! draws.11
For each !, the marginal cost to deliver to location 1, for the two lowest cost producers
at 1, and the two lowest cost producers at 2, are then
 1jw1
'!;1
;
 1jw1
'!;1
;
 2jw2
'!;2
;
 2jw2
'!;2

. (4)
If the number of entrants is 1, 2, or 3, then we can simply set the missing element in the
above set to infinity. Let aj! and aj! be the lowest and second lowest elements of this
set. The monopoly pricing for goods sold in country j is pj! =  1a

j!. In the equilibrium
outcome of Bertrand competition, price equals the minimum of the monopoly price and
the marginal cost aj! of the second lowest cost firm to deliver to j, i.e.
pj! = min
 
pj!,aj!

= min


   1a

j!,a

j!

. (5)
The markup of good ! at j is therefore
mj! =
pj!
a
j!
= min


   1 ,
aj!
aj!

. (6)
Note that firms’ markups may differ from the markups for consumers. A non-exporter’s
11Another non-fat-tailed distribution that is often used is bounded Pareto, e.g. Helpman, Melitz, and
Rubinstein (2008) and Melitz and Redding (2015).
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markup is the same as the markup facing consumers, but an exporter has one markup for
each market. Let the markup of an exporter producing ! be denoted as mf!. Then, due to
constant returns to scale,
mf! =

costs
revenue
 1
=

E1!
E1! + E2!
m 1!;1 +
E2!
E1! + E2!
m 1!;2
 1
:
In other words, an exporter’s markup is a harmonic mean of the markups in each market,
weighted by relative revenue.
We can now define producers’ aggregate markup, M selli . Let j (!) 2 f1; 2g denote the
source country for any particular good ! at destination j, and let j! 

pj!
Pj
1 
denote
country j’s spending share on good !. Then, we have
M selli =
Ri
wiLi
=
R
f!: 1(!)=ig 1!R1d! +
R
f!: 2(!)=ig 2!R2d!R
f!: 1(!)=igm
 1
1!1!R1d! +
R
f!: 2(!)=igm
 1
2!2!R2d!
(7)
=
 Z
f!: 1(!)=ig
m 11!
1!R1
Ri
d! +
Z
f!: 2(!)=ig
m 12!
2!R2
Ri
d!
! 1
;
which is the revenue-weighted harmonic mean of markups of all goods with source at
location i. Similarly, consumers’ aggregate markup M buyi is the revenue-weighted harmonic
mean across goods with destination at i:
M
buy
i =
Z !
0
m 1i! i!d!
 1
:
2.4 Wages and General Equilibrium
Observe that the total imports of country j from country i is
Rj;i =
Z
f!: j (!)=ig
Ej!d! = Rj
Z
f!: j (!)=ig

pj!
Pj
1 
d!  Rjj;i, (8)
where j (!) 2 f1; 2g denotes the source country for any particular good ! at destination
j and j;i denote the spending share of country j’s consumers on the goods produced in
i. The balanced trade condition is therefore R2;1 = R1;2, or equivalently,
R22;1 = R11;2. (9)
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Combine (7) and (9), and we have
M sell1 =
 Z
f!: 1(!)=1g
m 11!1!d! +
Z
f!: 2(!)=1g
m 12!2!
R2
R1
d!
! 1
=
 Z
f!: 1(!)=1g
m 11!1!d! +
Z
f!: 2(!)=1g
m 12!2!
1;2
2;1
d!
! 1
:
We choose country 1’s labor as numeraire, and hence w1 = 1, and w  w2 is also the
wage ratio. It is readily verified that j! depends only on relative wage w, but not on R1,
R2, L1, or L2 directly. Hence, M sell1 becomes a function of w only. Similarly, we have
M sell2 (w) =
 Z
f!: 1(!)=2g
m 1!;1!;1
2;1
1;2
(w) d! +
Z
f!: 2(!)=2g
m 1!;2!;2d!
! 1
:
We can then define R1 and R2 as a function of w:
R1 (w) = M
sell
1 (w)L1
R2 (w) = M
sell
2 (w)wL2.
Note that the above two equations are actually the labor market clearing conditions. Com-
bining these two equations, we thus arrive at the following one equation in one unknown
w:
R1 (w)
R2 (w)
=
M sell1 (w)
M sell2 (w)
L1
wL2
. (10)
Once w is computed, R1, R2, M sell1 , M sell2 , and the trade flows Rj;i are computed according
to the above procedure. Also note that from (10), what matters for an equilibrium is the
ratiosR2=R1 and L2=L1, rather than the levels. This is not surprising as the model features
constant returns to scale.
2.5 Welfare Decomposition
In this subsection, we show the decomposition of welfare, which is exactly that provided
by Holmes et al. (2014). Here, we attempt to be brief and at the same time self-contained.
Let Aj be the price index at j when all goods are priced at marginal cost:
Aj =
Z !
0
aj!~q
a
j!d!,
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where ~qaj=

~qaj! : ! 2 [0; !]
	
is the expenditure-minimizing consumption bundle that de-
livers one unit of utility under marginal cost pricing. Total welfare is defined as real
income Rj=Pj . As the product of producers’ aggregate markup and labor income entails
total revenue (7), we can write welfare at location i as
W Totalj =
Rj
Pj
= wjLj M sellj 
1
Pj
= wjLj  1
Aj
 Aj M
buy
j
Pj
 M
sell
j
M
buy
j
 wjLj W Prodj WAj W Rj :
Without loss of generality we focus on the welfare of country 1, and by choosing nu-
meraire, we can let w1 = 1. As the labor supply Lj is fixed in the analysis, the first term
in the welfare decomposition is a constant that we henceforth ignore. The second term
1=Aj is the productive efficiency index W Prodj ; this is what the welfare index would be with
constant markup. The index varies when there is technical change determining the un-
derlying levels of productivity. It also varies when trade costs decline, decreasing the
cost for foreign firms to deliver goods to the domestic country. Terms-of-trade effects also
show up in W Prodj because a lower wage from a source country raises the index.
The third term is the allocative efficiency index WAj
WAj 
Aj M buyj
Pj
=
R !
0
aj!~q
a
j!d!R !
0
aj!~qj!d!
 1: (11)
The inequality follows from the fact that under marginal cost pricing, ~qaj! is the optimal
bundle, whereas ~qj! is the optimal bundle under actual pricing. If markups are constant,
then for any pair of goods, the ratio of actual prices equals the ratio of marginal cost. In
this case, the two bundles become the same and WAj = 1. Once there is any dispersion of
markups, welfare deteriorates because resource allocation is distorted. Goods with higher
markups are produced less than optimally (employment is also less than optimal), and
those with low markups are produced more than optimally (employment is also more
than optimal).
The fourth term is a “terms of trade” effect on markups that depends on the ratio
of producers’ aggregate markup to consumers’ aggregate markup; thus we call it rela-
tive markup effect W Rj . This term is intuitive because a country’s welfare improves when
its firms sell goods with higher markups while its consumers buy goods with lower
markups. This term drops out in two special cases: under symmetric countries where
11
the two countries are mirror images of each other; and under autarky, as there is no dif-
ference between the two aggregate markups.
Note that as Holmes et al. focus on the symmetric country case, they do not explicitly
analyze the relative markup effectW Rj . As fitting to the Chinese economy, we allow asym-
metries between countries in all aspects of the model (labor force, productivity distribu-
tion, entry, and wages). Also note that the above decomposition requires only homothetic
preference and is thus applicable to all market structures.12
2.6 The Productive Efficiency and the ACR Formula
As is well known, the ACR welfare formula captures the gains from trade globally (i.e., for
arbitrary changes in trade cost) in a certain class of models with a constant trade elasticity.
This class includes BEJK and features no pro-competitive effect. In our model in which
pro-competitive effects may exist and trade elasticity may vary, the ACR formula does not
hold for arbitrary changes in trade costs. Nevertheless, as indicated by ACR, for models
with variable trade elasticity, the ACR formula may still capture the total gains from trade
locally (i.e., for infinitesimal changes in trade cost).13 Thus, we are interested in examining
whether our model predicts larger/smaller or similar total gains from trade as compared
with the local ACR formula.
We start the comparison by examining the similarity between the productive efficiency
W Prodj and the ACR welfare formula. Note that ACR’s proof of their theorems covers both
perfect competition and monopolistic competition. They do not prove why the BEJK
model, which features head-to-head Bertrand competition, fits their formula. As Holmes
et al. (2014) highlights, the distributional assumption and the number of firms are the
key. Whereas BEJK features a constant trade elasticity, the trade elasticity in our model is
a variable, and thus the macro restriction R3 in ACR does not hold here.
Following ACR, the import demand system is a mapping from (fwig; f ijg;fNig) into
X  fXijg, where Xij is the trade flow from i to j and Ni is the measure of goods that
is produced in each country i. R3 in ACR is a restriction on partial trade elasticity ii0j 
@ ln (Xij=Xjj) =@ ln  i0j of this system such that for any importer j and any pair of exporters
i 6= j and i0 6= j, ii0j =  < 0 if i = i0, and zero otherwise. Since there are only two countries
in our model, we are not concerned with the country index i0 6= i; j here, and thus we
simply denote ii0j as ij . Let vij be the share of country j’s expenditure on goods from i.
12For welfare decomposition under non-homothetic preference and monopolistic competition, see Wein-
berg (2015) and Dhingra and Morrow (2016).
13See footnote 13 and page 109 in ACR. This statement is true if the restriction R3 in their paper holds
locally.
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Then, in our two-country model, for any i 6= j,
ij =
@ ln

Xij
Xjj

@ ln  ij
=
@ ln

1 vjj
vjj

@ ln  ij
: (12)
Suppose we are in the class of models characterized in ACR with only two countries i
and j. Before knowing if R3 holds, the following holds for welfare in country j, Wj ,
d lnWj =  

vij
d ln vij   d ln vjj
ij
+ vjj
d ln vjj   d ln vjj
ij

(13)
=
1
ij
d ln vjj ,
where the last line uses vij + vjj = 1, which implies that vijd ln vij + vjjd ln vjj = 0.14 If R3
holds so that ij is a constant  across i and j and across different levels of variable trade
costs, then the local ACR formula can be expressed as
d lnWACRj =
1

d ln vjj . (14)
Moreover, the global formula W 0j=Wj =
 
v0jj=vjj
 1
 holds when R3 holds. We repeat the
derivation in ACR in (13) here to clarify that if R3 does not hold, the appropriate local
trade elasticity should be ij , which by definition is the elasticity of (1  vjj) =vjj to  ij .
Thus, when numerically computing the trade elasticity in Section 4.2 for China’s welfare
(j = 1), it is done by varying  21 by a small amount rather than by varying the symmetric
cost  21 =  12 =  .15
We examine how productive efficiency in our model is related to the ACR formula.
Recall that W Prodj = 1=Aj , where Aj is the price index under marginal cost pricing, i.e., the
equilibrium price index when all goods are priced at marginal costs. Thus, ACR’s proof
of Proposition 1 for the perfect competition case actually applies up to Step 3 withWj and
Pj there replaced with W Prodj and Aj here. That is, letting ~vij and ~
i
j be the share of country
j’s expenditure on goods from i and the trade elasticity under marginal cost pricing, we
14The expression in (13) can be easily obtained in ACR’s proof of Proposition 1 in the perfect competition
case. In the case of monopolistic competition, the same expression can be obtained by observing (A37),
d lnWj =  d lnPj , d lnij = d ln ij= (1  ) = 0 (p. 126) and d lnNj = 0 (p.127). Since we will apply the
ACR formula in our model, d ln ij = 0 because there are no fixed exporting costs. ACR show that R1 and
R2 imply d lnNj = 0.
15Note that in Melitz and Redding (2015), when they calculate trade elasticity in the case when it is a
variable, they vary  instead of 21. This is because they assume countries are symmetric and thus domestic
expenditure shares vjj are the same across countries.
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have
d lnAj =
nX
i=1
~vij
d ln ~vij   ln ~vjj
~ij
:
Similar to (13), for any i 6= j, the above implies
d lnW Prodj =  d lnAj =
1
~ij
d ln ~vjj . (15)
Note that the ACR formula (14) should be applied using actual trade flow to calculate
trade elasticity and domestic expenditure share (that is, actual pricing (5) should be used),
whereas (15) uses those under marginal cost pricing. However, there is a special case in
which ~vjj = vjj and hence ~ij = ij . When  = 1, the preference becomes Cobb-Douglas:
U = exp
Z !
0
ln q!d!

,
and the expenditure share on each good becomes the same (not responsive to prices). As
the domestic expenditure share is simply the fraction of all goods consumed in country j
that originate in country j, we have ~vjj = vjj . By (12), we also have ~ij = ij . In this case,
d lnWACRj = d lnW
Prod
j with the trade elasticity being ij .
We have now proved the following proposition. Note in particular that this proposi-
tion is applicable to all distributions of productivity draws and of per-product number of
firms.
Proposition 1. For infinitesimal changes in  , the change in the productive efficiency W Prodj can
be expressed as
d lnW Prodj =
1
~ij
d ln ~vjj;
where ~ij and ~vjj are the trade elasticity and domestic expenditure share under marginal cost pric-
ing. When  = 1 (Cobb-Douglas case), ~vjj = vjj , ~ij = ij , and d lnW Prodj = d lnWACRj .
In the case of  = 1, this proposition says that for infinitesimal changes in  , the ACR
formula captures productive efficiency but not the total gains from trade. That is, in this
case,
d lnW Totalj   d lnWACRj = d lnWA + d lnW Rj :
The distributional assumption in BEJK entails d lnWA +d lnW Rj = 0 because the resulting
markup distribution is invariant to trade cost. This is not the case here. In the case of
 > 1, our quantitative analysis using Chinese data in Section 4.2 reveals that d lnWACRj is
still relatively close to d lnW Prodj , and that d lnW Totalj are larger than d lnWACRj .
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For the intuition behind the gap, we distinguish all possible six cases of pricing, markups,
and trade flows in the following table. Without loss of generality, we focus on the market
at country 1, i.e., j = 1. Denote (i; i0) as the pair of locations where the first and second
lowest marginal costs to deliver to country 1 are located. We use ({) to denote the case
when the lowest marginal cost is from country i and it charges the monopoly price in
equilibrium.
(1; 1) (1; 2) (2; 1) (2; 2) (1) (2)
markup '

1
'1
w'1
'2
'2
w'1
'2
'2

 1

 1
price 1
'1
w
'2
1
'1
w
'2

 1
1
'1

 1
w
'2
markup affected by  No Yes Yes No No No
import affected by  No No No Yes No Yes
Note that for infinitesimal changes, the effect of a good ! switching between cases
can be ignored because at the border between any two cases, the markups must be the
same. Thus, apart from the general equilibrium effect on macro variables, the above table
provides a comprehensive anatomy of the effect of changes in  . Thus, apart from the
general equilibrium effect onRj and Pj , import is affected by  directly in the cases where
prices are affected by  and the suppliers are located at country 2. We ignore the effect
on exports because imports are what is needed for the ACR formula. To look at pro-
competitive effects, we look only at two cases where markups are affected by trade cost –
(1; 2) and (2; 1). In Case (1; 2), a lower  decreases both the price and markup but has no
effect on import because the supplier is domestic; this is similar to the entry-deterrence
example mentioned in the introduction. In Case (2; 1), a lower  increases the markup but
does not affect the price and import because the foreign supplier is constrained only by
the domestic best. Thus, in cases where markups are affected by  , imports are unaffected.
If the expenditure share of each case is unaffected by small changes in  , then the welfare
impacts of  via markups are totally independent of imports (Proposition 1). The reason
why Proposition 1 need not hold under  > 1 is that changes in trade cost  may change
the expenditure shares across goods and hence across different cases. Nevertheless, it
will be seen in the quantitative analysis in Section 4.2 that the effects due to changes in
expenditure share are minor, as the extra gains from trade over the ACR formula remain
roughly those due to pro-competitive effects.
In sum, Proposition 1 and the above table show how head-to-head competition sepa-
rates markups and trade flows, and hence make the total welfare gains from trade in our
model different from the ACR formula. In contrast, the total gains from trade in EMX
can be captured by the ACR formula because even with finite number of firms, each firm
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owns a variety and hence a demand curve along which the pricing is determined, tak-
ing into account strategic interactions among firms. A change in  changes the foreign
supplier’s delivered marginal cost, and therefore changes the price, markup, and import
simultaneously. Similarly, even though the ACR formula must be modified in Arkolakis
et al. (2018) to account for the change from CES preference to a general preference that
allows variable markup, the fact that each firm owns a variety under monopolistic com-
petition still makes trade flows sufficient statistics for welfare gains from trade.
3 Quantifying the Model
As the markup distribution is the central focus of the paper, our approach of quantify-
ing the model relies heavily on the distribution of markups, which is estimated from the
Chinese firm-level data. Note that unlike EMX whose benchmark focuses on symmetric
countries, our empirical implementation focuses on asymmetric countries, as the large
wage gap between China and the ROW should not be ignored since it may have a large
impact on parameter estimates, as well as potential large general equilibrium effects in
counter-factuals. Despite the lack of firm level data in the ROW, we demonstrate that
separating moments of exporters and nonexporters can help identify the different para-
meters of the two countries. In this subsection, we first describe the data and approach by
which our model is quantified. We then present and discuss the estimation results, and
make a comparison with the BEJK model.
3.1 Data
Our firm-level data set comes from the Economic Census data (1995 and 2004) from
China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), which covers all manufacturing firms, in-
cluding SOEs. The sample sizes for 1995 and 2004 are 458; 327 and 1; 324; 752, respec-
tively.16 The advantage of using this data set, instead of the commonly used firm-level
survey data set, which reports all SOEs and only those private firms with revenues of at
least 5 million renminbi, is that we do not have to deal with the issue of truncation. As
we are concerned with potential resource misallocation between firms, it is important to
have the entire distribution. We estimate the models separately for the years 1995 and
2004.
16The original data sets have larger sample sizes, but they also include some (but not all) non-
manufacturing industries, as well as firms without independent accounting and village firms, which en-
tail numerous missing values. The final sample is obtained after excluding these cases and adjusting for
industrial code consistency.
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We obtain world manufacturing GDP and GDP per capita from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (WDI). The aggregate Chinese trade data is obtained from
the UN COMTRADE.
3.2 Estimation of Markups
Under the constant returns to scale assumption, a natural way to estimate markups is
by taking the ratio of revenue to total costs, i.e., revenue productivity, or what we call
raw markup. However, it is important to recognize that, in general, raw markups may
differ across firms, not only because of the real markup differences, but also because of
differences in the technology with which they operate. To control for this potential source
of heterogeneity, we use modern IO methods to purge our markup estimates of the dif-
ferences in technology. In particular, we estimate markups following DLW’s approach,17
who calculate markups as
m! =
X!
X!
;
where X! is the input elasticity of output for input X , and X! is the share of expenditure
on input X in total revenue. To map our model into firm-level data, we relax the assump-
tions of a single factor of production and constant returns to scale. Following DLW, we
assume a translog production function.18 The estimation of firm-level markup hinges on
choosing an input X that is free of any adjustment costs, and the estimation of its output
elasticity X! . As labor is largely not freely chosen in China (particularly SOEs) and capital
is often considered a dynamic input (which makes its output elasticity difficult to inter-
pret), we choose intermediate materials as the input to estimate firm markup (see also
DLW). The full details of the markup estimation are relegated to Appendix A1.
Table 1 gives summary statistics of the markup distribution,19 with breakdowns in
each year and between exporters and non-exporters. Observe that the (unweighted)
mean markups all decrease between 1995 and 2004 for all firms, both exporters and non-
exporters. The (unweighted) standard deviation of markups decreases for non-exporters,
17We also conduct estimation and counter-factual analysis under raw markups as a robustness check.
18In our implementation of the DLW approach using Chinese firm-level data under the translog produc-
tion function, which allows variable returns to scale, it turns out that the returns to scale are quite close
to constant. See Table A1 in the appendix. Interestingly, EMX also found similar results using Taiwanese
firm-level data.
19Following the literature, e.g., De Loecker et al. (2016) and Lu and Yu (2015), we trim the estimated
markup distribution in the top and bottom 2:5 percentiles to alleviate the concern that the extreme outliers
may drive the results. Our results are robust to alternative trims (e.g., the top and bottom 1%; results are
available upon request). We also drop estimated markups that are lower than one, as our structural model
does not generate such markups.
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but increases slightly for exporters. Because there are more non-exporters than exporters
and the decrease in the standard deviation of non-exporters is larger than the increase in
the standard deviation of exporters, the overall standard deviation decreases. Almost all
of the percentiles decreased between 1995 and 2004. This is consistent with the pattern
seen in Figure 1 where the entire distribution becomes more condensed.
However, we note that the pattern described in Table 1 only hints at the existence
of pro-competitive effects. The reduction of dispersion of firm markups does not nec-
essarily mean that the allocative efficiency increases, as allocative efficiency depends on
consumer markups rather than firm markups. It does show that the markets facing Chi-
nese firms became more competitive. Also, we cannot reach a conclusion yet about the
relative markup effect, as we do not observe the consumers’ aggregate markup directly.
We need to quantify the model and simulate both types of markups to conduct welfare
analysis.
3.3 Simulated Method of Moments
3.3.1 Method
Given measures of fw;R1; R2g, we use moments of markups, trade flows, number of firms
and fraction of exporters to estimate all parameters except L2=L1 by SMM. We estimate
the parameters using SMM for 1995 and 2004 separately. To adequately reflect the changes
in the environment of the Chinese economy, it is important to allow all parameters to
vary between the two years. If we instead have the change in trade cost  in between two
years explain all the changes in the observed moments, then the role of trade cost may be
exaggerated.
For i = 1; 2, the parameters to be estimated are
 : trade cost
 : total measure of goods
i : mean number of entrants per product
i : mean parameter of log-normal productivity draw
i : standard deviation parameter of log-normal productivity draw
 : elasticity of substitution
Note that for productivity, we normalize 2 = 0 (when ln' is zero, ' = 1) because only
the relative magnitude of 1 to 2 matters. Choosing 2 amounts to choosing a unit. Let
the inverses of markups be called cost shares, as they are the shares of costs in revenues.
As shown in Section 2.3, aggregate markups are harmonic means of markups, which are
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the inverses of the arithmetic means of cost shares weighted by revenues. However, it is
unclear how a ‘harmonic variance’ could be defined. Since the (arithmetic) variance of
markup is positively related to the variance of cost shares, we choose to work with cost
shares in calculating moments.
In order to use SMM to estimate these eight parameters, we need at least eight mo-
ments. We use the following 14 moments: the import and export shares; relative number
of firms; fraction of exporters; revenue-weighted mean and standard deviation of cost
shares for both exporters and non-exporters; and the 50th, 95th, and 99th percentiles of
the markup distribution for exporters and non-exporters.20
Trade is highly aggregated; hence almost all parameters affect the three trade mo-
ments. Nevertheless, we expect them to be more sensitive to the trade cost  and hence
help identify this parameter. We will explain shortly how the relative number of firms
help identify . The standard deviation and the two measures of centrality are meant to
capture the overall pattern of the markup distributions. As the model is about the top
firms, the 95th and 99th percentiles are important moments to have. Moreover, the model
implies that the range of markup is m 2 1; 
 1

, and hence the monopoly markup is
the upper bound of markup distribution. Recall the economics behind this. An active
firm of a product charges the second lowest marginal cost when such cost is sufficiently
low. When the second marginal cost is high, the markup is bounded by the monopoly
markup because the firm’s profit is still subject to the substitutability between products.
The higher the substitutability (), the lower the monopoly markup the firm will charge.
Thus, another important role of the 99th percentile is to reflect this upper bound and help
identify .
As our data shows whether a firm is an exporter or not, we use moments of exporters
and non-exporters separately because the way in which parameters of countries 1 and 2
(China and the ROW) enter these moments differs between these two groups. The intu-
ition is clear: Chinese exporters face direct competition in the ROW’s markets and non-
exporters face foreign competition on their home turf. As we lack firm-level data from the
ROW, this approach is crucial for backing out the parameters of the ROW.21 The parame-
ters of the ROW is not needed in a symmetric-country estimation/calibration, which may
explain why it is often adopted in the literature. We will also estimate a symmetric coun-
try version for comparison. Nevertheless, our exercise demonstrates that this approach of
20The import share is the import penetration ratio, i.e. IM/(R1-EX+IM), and the export share is the total
export divided by the same denominator. All the cost share moments are weighted by revenues.
21Whereas using such firm-level data with information on firms’ exporting status gives the advantage of
backing out parameters for the ROW, it also implies that one cannot use an n-country model with n  2
unless one can gather firm-level data for all of these countries, which is a daunting task.
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separating moments of exporters and non-exporters works well for asymmetric-country
estimation.
The model structure implies that all of the above-mentioned moments can be sim-
ulated for a given set of all parameters besides L2=L1 and observed macro variables
fw;R1; R2g. Specifically, the actual supplier and the second best supplier in each mar-
ket are identified by (4). Pricings and markups are given by (5) and (6). Then, the price
index and sales are given by (1) and (2). Import and export are then aggregated from
sales. The general equilibrium conditions are not used in SMM since the macro variables
fw;R1; R2g are given, and hence L2=L1 is not needed. However, L2=L1 is still needed in
counter-factuals, and it is inferred by matching the observed w with the estimated pa-
rameters using the final general equilibrium condition (10).22 The key advantage of this
approach is that it makes the multiple-sector estimation possible because it allows a con-
venient sector-by-sector estimation where different sectors are linked by a Cobb-Douglas
utility function. There are 29 manufacturing sectors in China, and each sector carries 8
parameters. If one were to also include L2=L1 in the SMM procedure (and perhaps use
observed w as a moment), this implies the need to estimate 298+1 = 233 parameters si-
multaneously in an over-identified estimation with w computed as a general equilibrium
object. This is not feasible. For more details of the multiple-sector estimation, see Section
5.1. Note that the model simulated R2=R1 is generally different from the data ones. We
will check the external validity of our approach by comparing the data and simulated
R2=R1.
Recall that the actual measure of goods is given by (3): ! = 

1  e (1+2), but this
is not directly observed. What is observable is the number of active Chinese firms:
N1 = 
 
1  e 1 Pr  1
'1!
<
w
'2!

:
As our simulation of the number of goods must be discrete,  must be a large number
in order to match the large number of Chinese firms in the data. To calculate the rela-
tive number of Chinese firms, we divide both sides of the above equation by N , a large
number that is chosen for normalizing the moment:
N1
N
=

 
1  e 1
N
 Pr

1
'1!
<
w
'2!

: (16)
22We also opt not to measure L2=L1 from data, as this is a difficult object to measure because it involves
considerations of human capital and non-manufacturing sectors, etc. Moreover, it is also difficult to find a
robust way to combine the population size and human capital across different countries in the rest of the
world.
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Here, we define ~ by   total_goods_baseline*~, where total_goods_baseline is set to be
250; 000. We will report ~ in the place of  to avoid reporting a very large number. The
roles of total_goods_baseline and N are different. The former affects how precise a simula-
tion is; the larger the total_goods_baseline, the more goods and firms there are and hence
the more precise a simulation will be. The constant N is only for normalization and does
not affect the estimates.23
How the macro variables fw;R1; R2g are obtained from data is as follows. To calculate
w = w2=w1, we first obtain the GDP per capita of China and the ROW from WDI.24 We
then proxy wi by multiplying GDP per capita by the labor income shares for the ROW
and China, which are taken from Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014).25 For R1 and R2, we
first obtain the manufacturing GDPs of China and the ROW from WDI data. We then use
the input-output table for China (2002) and the US (1997–2005) to obtain GDP’s share of
total revenue. We then use such shares and the manufacturing GDPs to imputeR1 andR2
as total revenue. Although our model does not distinguish value added and revenue, we
choose to interpret Ri as total revenue rather than GDP to be consistent with our export
and import moments, which are also in terms of revenue.
3.3.2 SMM Result
The estimation result is shown in Table 2. The model fits the data moments reasonably
well, and the small standard errors indicate that each parameter is relatively precisely
estimated. The bottom row reports data and model simulated R2=R1, and they turn out
to be reasonably close, serving as additional validation of the model.
As we estimate the models for 1995 and 2004 separately, the changes of the para-
meters are strikingly consistent with well-known empirical patterns about the Chinese
economy during this period. From 1995 to 2004, the estimate of  shows a dramatic de-
crease from 2:31 to 1:78. The measure of goods  more than triples from 0:19 to 0:66. This
basically reflects the sharp increase in the number of firms between the two Economic
Censuses, from 458,327 in 1995 to 1,324,752 in 2004, which is almost triple. The mean
23We set N = 2; 000; 000 so that the relative numbers of firms are 0:210 and 0:596 in 1995 and 2004, re-
spectively. We initially set total_goods_baseline to 2; 500; 000. However, we find that the calculated moments
under total_goods_baseline= 250; 000 are virtually the same as those under 2; 500; 000. For faster computing
speed, we thus set total_goods_baseline= 250; 000. To fit the above-mentioned relative numbers of firms (the
left-hand side of [16]) in the SMM procedure, we set N = 200; 000 so that we effectively scale both the
numerator and denominator of the right-hand side of (16) by 1=10.
24The ROW’s GDP per capita is the population-weighted average of GDP per capita across all countries
other than China.
25The ROW’s labor share is the weighted average of labor share across all countries besides China, with
the weight being relative GDP.
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number of entrants per product in China (1) increased from 2:46 to 2:62, whereas in the
ROW it decreased from 5:54 to 5:02. China’s mean log productivity (1) relative to the
ROW increased from  2:40 to  1:76. These numbers are negative, meaning that China’s
productivity is lower than that of the ROW. Also, we see a slight decrease (increase) in
the dispersion parameter of the productivity distribution in China (ROW). Interestingly,
the productivity dispersion is larger in China than in the ROW, which is consistent with
the finding by Hsieh and Klenow (2009).26
The  estimate we obtain is approximately 1:45 in both years.27 This estimate is quite
low compared with those estimates in models that feature constant markups (often a CES
preference coupled with either monopolistic competition or perfect competition), and this
is driven mainly by the need to fit the two 99th percentiles in the markup distribution. Re-
call that = (   1) in our model is the upper bound rather than the average of markups.
Under a constant-markup model and using the harmonic mean of firm markups in 1995,
1:259, this implies  = 4:86. However, in the current model, this value of  implies that
m 2 [1; 1:259], which cuts 50:6% off the estimated markup distribution. Then, these large
markups where most distortions come from are ignored. In fact, the pro-competitive ef-
fects of trade become negligible under m 2 [1; 1:259] because the associated allocative
efficiency is much closer to the first-best case (constant markup) without the very skewed
larger half of the markups. EMX also found that the extent of pro-competitive effects
depends largely on the extent to which markups can vary in the model. In fact, our esti-
mate is strikingly similar to the estimate of the same parameter (1:37) in Simonovska and
Waugh (2014b) with the optimal weighting matrix in their method of moments procedure.
Note that in BEJK, the trade elasticity is given by the tail index of the Fréchet distri-
bution, and is independent of the elasticity of substitution . In our model where the
productivity draws deviate from Fréchet,  may potentially matter in determining trade
elasticity, but the effect seems small, as we will see in Section 4.2 that the trade elasticities
in our model are quite close to those found by Simonovska and Waugh (2014b) under the
BEJK model.
Based on the 2004 estimation, we calculate a Jacobian matrix in which each entry gives
26The mean of a log-normal distribution is e+
2=2. According to our estimates of 1 and 1 in these
two years, this translates to an annual productivity growth rate of 7:25%. This impressive growth rate is
actually similar to the 7:96% estimated by Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012). Note that the 7:25%
growth rate here is relative to the ROW. If the ROW also grows in their productivity, the actual productivity
growth rate could be even higher. In fact, Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang, and Zhang (2012) find a 12%
average TFP growth rate at industry level. The data used in both above-mentioned papers is the annual
manufacturing survey data from 1998 to 2007.
27Note that this estimate of  is not sensitive to sample size. In our multi-sector exercise, the unweighted
means of s are 1:56 and 1:53 for 1995 and 2004, respectively, and 24 of the 29 s are within one standard
deviation from the mean in both years. See Section 5.1.4.
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a rate of change of a moment to a parameter; this is shown in Table 3. The larger the
absolute value of a rate of change, the more sensitive this moment is to the parameter,
and hence the more useful this moment is in identifying this parameter, at least at the
local area of the optimal estimates. With such Jacobian matrices, the asymptotic variance-
covariance matrices of the optimal estimates can be calculated to produce the standard
errors reported in Table 2.
It is obvious from Table 3 that  is almost single-handedly determined by the 99th
percentile of markups for exporters, and this moment has little influence on other para-
meters. Trade cost  affects almost all moments significantly except the 99th percentile of
markups for exporters. It is natural to see that the two trade moments, the relative number
of Chinese firms and the fraction of exporters are particularly strong for identifying this.
Interestingly, when  increases, the 95th percentiles of markups for both exporters and
non-exporters, as well as the 99th percentile of markups for exporters, increase sharply.
For non-exporters, this is intuitive because a higher  provides non-exporters more in-
sulation from foreign competition, and the top non-exporters gain more from this. For
exporters, a higher  makes it harder for them to compete in foreign markets, but recall
that an exporter’s markup is a harmonic mean of the markups in both the domestic and
foreign markets. It must be that the gains in markups at home outweigh the losses in
markups in foreign markets.
For the identification of 1, the top percentiles of markups play the dominant role.
The intuition is as follows. Fixing other parameters, when 1 increases, the number of
entrants per product in China increases. Due to the non-fat-tailed nature of the produc-
tivity distribution, the ratio between the top two draws is narrowed, but since this ratio
is indeed the markup and since this is particularly pronounced for the top markups, the
top percentiles are particularly useful in identifying this parameter. The relative number
of firms also plays some role, as (16) shows that the larger the 1, the larger the proba-
bility that China draws a positive number of firms from the Poisson distribution. For 2,
the 95th percentile of markups for exporters and the export share are the key moments. A
larger 2 implies fiercer competition on the foreign turf for exporters as it brings out better
competitors from the ROW, reducing both China’s export share and the 95th percentile of
markups for exporters.
For the measure of goods , the relative number of Chinese firms is the most useful
moment. An increase in mean productivity parameter 1 increases export share, the num-
ber of Chinese firms, and the fraction of exporters, but decreases the import share. These
are all intuitive. However, an increase in 1 sharply increases the 95th percentile markup
for non-exporters but sharply decreases the 95th percentile markup for exporters. This is
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because top non-exporters are actually not the most productive firms – their productivi-
ties are somewhere in the middle of the distribution and hence they gain in markup by
having higher productivity. In contrast, top exporters are the most productive firms, and
they lose in markup when they become even more productive, due to the compression at
the upper tail of the productivity distribution.
For 1 and 2, first note that they are not only dispersion parameters, but their in-
creases induce increases in means as well. Hence, the direction of changes due to a change
in 1 is similar to that of a change in 1, but the intensities are quite different. For example,
1 has much larger effects on almost all moments of markups than 1, but it has smaller
impacts on the trade moments. In particular, the 95th percentile markup for exporters
is extremely sensitive to 1 because 1 affects the top productivities much more than 1.
Also note the interesting pattern: 1 and 2 affect many moments in opposite ways. An
increase in 2 increases both the mean and dispersion of the ROW’s productivity, and
this increases China’s import share, and decreases China’s export share and number of
firms. It compresses the markup distribution of non-exporters, but it increases the 95th
percentile of markups for exporters.
Finally, we discuss a point that is often mentioned in studies of the Chinese econ-
omy. China underwent various reforms, including but not limited to trade reforms, in
this decade. One notable reform is that of SOEs during the late 90s, which is well known
to have made China’s various industries more competitive. Although we do not model
the source of distortion explicitly in our model and rather treat markups (and their dis-
tribution) as a reflection of distortion, the fact that we observe increases in both 1 and 
may be partly due to these reforms. The compression in markup distribution (Table 1 and
Figure 1) and the increasing number of manufacturing firms are also consistent with the
above-mentioned reforms.
3.4 Comparison with the BEJK Model
As mentioned, there are no pro-competitive effects and the ACR formula is satisfied in the
BEJK model. A natural question is whether our model fits the data better than the BEJK
model, at least for some aspects of data patterns. This question is important because if
the BEJK model dominates our model in almost all aspects of data patterns, then one
may be less interested in our welfare analysis. To examine this, we conduct two sets
of comparisons. The first set is to fit the BEJK model by SMM to the above-mentioned
moments that discipline our estimation, and then compare with our benchmark result
from Table 2. The second set is to add moments that BEJK were concerned with matching,
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and use SMM to estimate both the BEJK and our model. To save space, we conduct
estimations for 2004 only.
We highlight a few features in BEJK quantification; readers are referred to their paper
for details. By some change of variables, BEJK show that the Fréchet scaling parameters
fTig, trade costs fnig, and wages (or input prices) fwig can be absorbed into trade shares
fnig, which is observable. By making assumptions on non-manufacturing sectors, BEJK
treat wages fwig as exogenous, and hence the observed trade shares can also be treated
as parameters. Total expenditure fxng, which corresponds to our fRng are also treated
as exogenous.28 Thus, given trade shares fnig and total expenditure fxng, the remaining
parameters to estimate are only the Fréchet shape parameter  and elasticity of substitu-
tion . BEJK use productivity and size advantages of exporters (relative to nonexporters)
in their 1992 US plant-level data to back out  and , where productivity is measured by
value-added per worker, and size is measured by domestic sales.29 They also examine ex-
ternal validity by checking the fit to the following moments: fraction of exporters among
all firms, the fraction of revenues from exports (which is also called export intensity),
variability in log productivity and that in log size (measured by standard deviation).
One important difference of our model from BEJK is that fwi; Rig are both endogenous
because our model does not assume an outside sector and loses the feature of constant
share of total profits in total revenue. Thus, our model is harder to quantify than BEJK,
with the BEJK enjoying the advantage of easy application for a multi-country quantitative
analysis. Nevertheless, our focus is different as we focus on the distribution of markups.
Our first set of comparisons is thus to examine the fit of the relatively simple BEJK model
to the moments that concern us. The second set is then to also take into account the
moments that concern BEJK. As the fraction of exporters is already included in our set of
moments, the second set adds six moments (for export intensity we report both weighted
mean and weighted standard deviation).30 We compute the trade shares fnig and fxng
in our two-country framework that is consistent with our data.31
28BEJK assumes that production functions take intermediate inputs, and so there is an involved discus-
sion related to total expenditure. However, even without intermediates, the total expenditure (which equals
total revenue) can also be taken as exogenous because their model features a constant share of total profit
out of total revenue. The total revenue is thus proportional to total labor income, wiLi, which is exogenous
in their model.
29More precisely, the productivity advantage is the ratio of the average productivity of exporters to that
of non-exporters. Size advantage is defined similarly.
30The weight is an exporter’s revenues.
31To more accurately compute total expenditure and trade shares, we recognize the trade surplus that
China enjoys. Note that the import share entails 1;2 = 0:222. Then, 1;1 = 1   1;2 = 0:778. Recogizing
China’s trade surplus in 2004, D2004 = 0:0263  R1, we compute total expenditure Y1 = R1   D and
Y2 = R1 +D. We also compute 2;1 from the following equation (R2 +D)2;1 = (R1  D)1;2 +D.
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The estimation results are reported in Table 4. Also note that in BEJK, the measure of
goods is normalized to one, and hence the issue surrounding our  parameter does not
exist there. Accordingly, we drop the moment “relative number of firms” in estimating
BEJK. In the first set of comparison, by simply counting the number of moments that
each model fits better, our model fits slightly better as it fits seven moments better than
the BEJK model out of 13 moments. In the second set, our model also fits better than BEJK
as it fits 12 moments better than the BEJK model out of 19 moments. In particular, in all of
the seven moments that concern BEJK, our model fits better in six of them. Comparison
by counting moments is, of course, a bit crude. Let error be defined as the absolute value
of the difference between model and data moment as a fraction of data moment; the
average errors in the first set are 0:098 and 0:124 in our model and BEJK, respectively. In
the second set, the average errors are 0:308 and 0:347, respectively. Hence, this metric also
shows that our model fits better in both sets of comparisons. Several more observations
are in order.
First, the most striking pattern of the estimates is that the  estimates in both models
increase significantly from around 1:45 to 3:6 when the BEJK moments are included. This
is consistent with the BEJK estimate of  at 3:79 and mainly because the BEJK moments
emphasize sales. The BEJK estimate of  is 3:6, whereas the estimates here are only slightly
higher. The reason for the low  in the first set is to allow a larger range whereby markups
can vary so as to fit the markup distribution better. When  becomes larger in the second
set, the fit on the moments of markups becomes much worse. This tradeoff is a common
feature of the two models.
Second, comparing the estimations of our model in the two sets, the parameter es-
timates generally do not vary much: the main differences are the increase in  and the
decreases in 1 and 2. Whereas  increases to fit the sales moments, causing a narrow
range of markups and the model implied markups to be generally much lower than the
data counterparts, both 1 and 2 decrease so that markups can increase to improve the fit
on this margin. This mechanism is lacking in the BEJK model, and this explains partially
why our model fits the markup moments better than BEJK in the second set.
Third, the fact that the BEJK model does not fit these (mostly micro) moments as well
is not totally surprising. The BEJK model is highly tractable, much easier to quantify and
apply to a multi-country setting, and explains the gravity equation. Much of its tractabil-
ity comes from the fact that various country-specific parameters are absorbed into trade
shares and total expenditures, which are treated as exogenous and can be taken from data.
In short, there are four pre-determined parameters fx1; x2g and f11; 12; 21; 22g, which
are actually two parameters because
P
i ni = 1, and two parameters to be estimated. In
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this sense, some data features are built into the BEJK model from the outset, and hence
it is natural that the BEJK model fits the trade shares almost perfectly. Nevertheless, if
there is any data pattern not accounted for by these pre-determined parameters, the BEJK
model then relies on the adjustments in  and  to carry the load. In contrast, our model
is more difficult to compute and quantify, but it speaks to micro moments with more
flexibility with a richer micro structure. Interestingly, note that whereas our estimation
does not input trade shares directly, our model fits the trade moments reasonably well; in
particular, our model fits the fraction of exporters better than the BEJK model.
4 Gains from Trade
In this section, we conduct a battery of counter-factual analyses to examine the welfare
gains from trade.
4.1 Welfare Analysis: Between 1995 and 2004 and from Autarky
To examine gains from trade, we conduct two counter-factual analyses by fixing all pa-
rameter values at the 2004 level and changing only  . In the first analysis, we simulate
welfare and its components when  is changed to the 1995 level, and we calculate the
percentage changes of welfare and its components. In the second analysis, we take  to a
prohibitive value so that the economy goes to autarky.
The results are shown in Table 5. The welfare gains of changing  from 1995’s level
to 2004’s level are 7:1%, in which allocative efficiency accounts for 20:6% (1:5=7:1) and
relative markup effect accounts for  0:7%. Thus, these pro-competitive effects jointly ac-
count for 19:9% of the total gains from trade. In fact, both aggregate markups M sell and
Mbuy decrease during this period, which is a natural result under trade liberalization, but
the percentage decrease in the consumers’ aggregate markup Mbuy is smaller. Overall, al-
though the relative markup effect is negative, it is relatively small, whereas the combined
effect can account for about one fifth of the total gains. The total gains from autarky to
2004’s  are, of course, much larger, at 28%, but the decomposition is similar to the first
analysis.
To understand the intuition behind the gains due to allocative efficiency, we follow
Holmes et al. (2014) to distinguish markup changes by a cost channel and a price channel.
An increase in  increases marginal costs proportionately in events (2; 1) ; (2; 2), and (2)
as defined in Section 2.6. This channel reduces markups when prices are held fixed. An
increase in  increases prices proportionately in events (1; 2) ; (2; 2), and (2) and markups
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when costs are held fixed. From country 1’s viewpoint, Holmes et al. show that
A  d lnW
A
d ln 
=

Acost + 
A
price
 d ln (w)
d ln 
; (17)
where
Acost = s2

Em 12
Em 1
  Em
Em2

, (18)
Aprice =  s
p"

1  Em
Em
p"

. (19)
Here, E is the revenue-weighted harmonic expectation operator, and thus Em is actually
the consumers’ aggregate markup M buy as defined earlier. Also, s denotes an expenditure
share, and the subscript 2 denotes the set of imported goods (from country 2), which
also represents the cost channel. The subset 
p" is the set of goods affected by the price
channel.
As the general equilibrium effect term d ln (w) =d ln  is generally positive, the sign of
the allocative efficiency hinges on the signs of Acost and Aprice. Both terms are negative un-
der the 1995 and 2004 estimates, implying positive allocative efficiency gains when trade
costs reduce. More specifically, the mean markup of imported goods Em2 is lower than
that of all goods (so that Em=Em2 > 1 > Em 12 =Em 1). When prices are held fixed,
a trade liberalization reduces costs and increases markups of imported goods, reducing
the discrepancy between Em2 and Em and mitigating distortion. Similarly, a trade liber-
alization decreases prices and markups through the price channel. Under our estimates,
Em
p" is greater than Em, and thus a trade liberalization reduces markup dispersion and
distortion through the price channel, too.
The key of the above discussion is that Em2 < Em < Em
p" under our model and
estimates. In the BEJK model, Em2 = Em because the markup distribution conditional
on the source is actually independent of the source. Hence, the cost channel disappears
(Acost = 0). As the markup distribution in any country is invariant to trade costs, Acost +
Aprice = 0, and thus 
A
price = 0. Foreign firms selling to China need to pay trade costs
that domestic firms avoid. Other things being equal, this drives up the costs and lowers
the markups of foreign firms so that Em2 < Em. However, there is also a selection of
productivities that only relatively productive foreign firms can export, and this tends to
increase markups of foreign firms. This latter force critically depends on the upper tail
of the productivity distribution. Under the Fréchet structure in BEJK, this force is so
strong that the two forces exactly counterbalance, entailing Em2 = Em. In contrast, the
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selection force is not as strong with log-normal productivity draws in our model, and
thus Em2 < Em. The intuition for why Em < Em
p" is similar.32
Next, we examine whether the result of “diminishing returns in openness” in EMX
holds here. The following table summarizes the welfare gains reported in their study,
as well as the breakdown in Ricardian gains and allocative efficiency. There is an obvi-
ous “diminishing returns” in allocative efficiency, as the opening up from autarky to 10%
import share improves welfare by 1:2%, whereas further opening up from 10% to 20% im-
proves welfare by only 0:3%. But such a diminishing-returns pattern does not show up in
the Ricardian component. As a result, the contribution of allocative efficiency diminishes
rapidly from 1:2=3:1  38% to 0:3=2:8  10:7%.
Import share % in EMX Importance of WA
Total Welfare Ricardian WA
0 to 10% 3:1 1:9 1:2 38:7%
10% to 20% 2:8 2:5 0:3 10:7%
Panel B of Table 5 reports the result from a similar exercise. Note that EMX’s pro-
competitive effect includes only allocative efficiency but not the relative markup effect,
as their formulation focuses on symmetric countries. To compare, we ignore the relative
markup effect. A similar diminishing returns pattern in allocative efficiency is obvious,
dropping from 4:2% to 1:3%. But, unlike in EMX, we also see sharp diminishing returns
in our counter-factuals for total welfare and the Ricardian component. As a result, we do
not see a diminishing contribution in allocative efficiency. Indeed, the contribution stays
around 23%, which is quite close to the results reported in Panel A.
Looking at both panels together, the contribution of pro-competitive effects ranges
from 19:9% to 23:5%, and the contribution of allocative efficiency ranges from 20:6% to
24:2%. Despite the differences in model structures, our estimates turn out to be in the
ballpark of EMX’s estimates, which range from 11% to 38%.
4.2 Comparison with the ACR Formula
In this subsection, we compare the welfare gains in this model with the ACR formula in
two ways. First, we compare with the local ACR formula for small changes in trade cost.
32Observe that the cost and price channels have two sets in common; the only difference is that the cost
channel has the case (2; 1) whereas the price channel has the case (1; 2). Again, the fact that domestic firms
need not pay trade costs compared with foreign firms implies that the average markup in the case (1; 2)
is high compared with that in case (2; 1) and the overall average, and thus Em < Em
p" . The Frechét
structure in BEJK implies that the selection force introduces sufficiently productive foreign firms, and thus
depresses the markups in case (1; 2) so that Em = Em
p" . But this is not the case under log-normal
productivity draws.
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Second, as trade elasticity is a variable, the global ACR formula does not apply, but one
can integrate the local formula to examine the gains from 1995’s  to 2004’s  in a similar
fashion to Panel A of Table 5.
For the first comparison, recall from Section 2.6 that for the case of  = 1 (Cobb-
Douglas), the ACR formula captures the gains in productive efficiency for small changes
in trade costs, but not the total gains from trade. For general  > 1, analytical results on
the comparison with the ACR formula are not available, and here we provide a quantita-
tive analysis based on the estimated models at 1995 and 2004. For this exercise, we investi-
gate the effect of a small reduction h in the logarithm of trade cost so that ln  0 = ln () h.
The results are reported in Table 6. Here, the welfare gains are expressed in terms of elas-
ticity to trade cost, i.e., d ln (W ) =d ln  , where W can be W Total;W Prod;WAWR; or WACR.
As discussed in Section 2.6, the trade elasticity used in evaluating d lnWACR is 21.33
The local trade elasticities in our estimated model in 1995 and 2004 are  2:85 and
 3:30, which are lower than standard estimates in the literature but surprisingly close to
the estimates of trade elasticity under the BEJK model in Simonovska and Waugh (2014b),
which range from  2:74 to  3:32.34 As explained by Simonovska and Waugh (2014b),
different micro mechanisms imply different distributions of price gaps of goods between
countries. For example, price gaps are on average smaller in the BEJK model than those in
the Eaton-Kortum model. To match the same mean price gap from the data, the produc-
tivity dispersion needs to be larger in the BEJK model than the Eaton-Kortum one. This
implies a smaller tail index of the Fréchet distribution and hence smaller trade elasticity
in the BEJK model. The degrees of dispersion in productivity, price gaps, and markups
are all positively related. Also, the differences in the moments of markups between ex-
porters and non-exporters may play a similar role to the price gaps in Simonovska and
Waugh (2014b). Thus, to fit the moments of markups, firm productivities in our model
also need to be sufficiently dispersed; it turns out the local trade elasticities in this model
are close to their estimates.
In 1995, the welfare elasticity of trade cost is 0:249, meaning a 1% reduction in trade
cost  induces a 0:249% increase in real income; 23:2% of this elasticity is from pro-
competitive effects. The ACR formula entails a welfare elasticity of 0:190, which is quite
close to the elasticity of productive efficiency 0:191. As a result, the totals gains from
trade are larger than the gains predicted by the ACR formula by 31:3%; most of these
extra gains are from pro-competitive effects. In the 2004 model, the contribution of pro-
33Here, we set we set h = 0:0001, and thus  0 is about 0:1% off  . To reduce the secant error in calculating
trade elasticity, we use two-point formula: f 0(x) = [f(x+ h)  f(x  h)] =2h, where x = ln(21) and f =
ln((1  v11)=v11). Note that when calculating the trade elasticity 21, wages are taken as fixed, as in ACR.
34See Tables 4 and 7 in their paper.
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competitive effects and the additional gains over the ACR formula are smaller at 20:3%
and 13:0%, respectively. Note that the contributions of pro-competitive effects in Table 6
are still relatively similar in magnitude to those reported in Table 5.
Note that the total gains and their components (as point elasticities) are all larger in
2004 than in 1995. To understand why this is the case, we focus on the allocative efficiency
first. We compute Acost and Aprice according to (18) and (19), and find that both 
A
cost and
Aprice are negative, implying positive allocative efficiency gains from a decrease in  . The
Acost + 
A
price  d lnW
A
d ln(w)
term is  0:049 and  0:042 in 1995 and 2004, respectively, but the
general equilibrium term d ln (w) =d ln  is 1:18 and 1:73; respectively. It is then clear that
the allocative efficiency gains are larger in 2004 mainly because of the general equilibrium
term. As w is 10:25 in 1995 (compared with 5:18 in 2004), a percentage decrease in  in
1995 can only induce a smaller percentage decrease in w because w is large. Apart from
the general equilibrium term, Acost + Aprice is smaller in 2004, which is in line with the facts
that the productivity distribution in China is less skewed in 2004 and that the difference
in average productivity between China and the ROW has become smaller.
As the productive efficiency gains in our model approximate (roughly) the ACR gains,
consider the ACR gains under symmetric countries for clearer intuition. In this situation,
the ACR formula becomes d lnWACR=d ln  =   (1  v). The smaller the trade cost  ,
the smaller the domestic expenditure share v and the larger the ACR gains. Hence, the
productive efficiency gains is larger in 2004 mainly because the trade cost estimate  is
significantly lower in 2004 than in 1995.
For the second comparison, we integrate the local ACR formula to compute what their
formula would predict for a change in trade cost between 1995 and 2004’s levels. That is,
we compute WACR,20041 =W
ACR,1995
1
ln
WACR,20041
WACR,19951
=
Z 2004
1995
d lnWACR1 () =
Z 2004
1995
d

ln v11 ()
 ()

. (20)
We relegate the calculation details to Appendix A2. The result is that the gains from trade
according to the ACR formula are 5:9%. The total gains from trade 7:1% (Table 5) are
20:3% higher than the ACR formula.
In the benchmark exercise, the overall gains at 7:1% seems a relatively large num-
ber compared with those found in the literature. The sources of the larger gains com-
pared with the literature are three-fold. The first source is the large reduction in trade
cost, which is essentially inferred by the large increases in trade flows and the fraction
of exporter during 1995–2004. This means wider bounds of integration in (20). If the
trade elasticity were a constant, (20) would reduce to cW = v^1=, and the large change
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in trade cost would imply a low value of v^. Second, even though trade elasticity is
a variable in our model, it ranges from  2:28 to  3:58 for  2 [ 2004;  1995]. Thus, the
WACR,20041 =W
ACR,1995
1 computed by (20) is bounded below by the computed number where
 () is forced to be a constant  3:58. If we force  () =  5, as is standard in the litera-
ture, then WACR,20041 =W
ACR,1995
1 = 1:033.35 Thus, the second source of the larger gains is this
gap between 3:3% and 5:9% that is created by the difference in trade elasticity. Then, the
third source of the larger gains is the gap between 5:9% and 7:1% that is mainly due to
pro-competitive effects.36
As explained in Section 2.6, the main reason why Proposition 1 (d lnW Prodj = d lnWACRj
when  = 1) need not hold under  > 1 is that changes in trade cost  may change
the expenditure shares across goods and hence across different cases in the table in that
subsection. Recall that when a good experiences a change in markup due to a change in
trade cost, there is no change in trade flow (or, more precisely, imported value). These
are actually cases (1; 2) and (2; 1) in that table. Under the 2004 estimates, the fraction of
goods and expenditure share in these two cases combined are 0:48 and 0:46, respectively.
When trade cost  is changed to the 1995 level, these numbers become 0:52 and 0:49, re-
spectively. Thus, there are significant portions of goods and expenditure where changes
in markups are not associated with import. Moreover, the changes in these two magni-
tudes are slight, corroborating the intuition highlighted in Section 2.6 that most of the
extra gains compared with the ACR formula come from pro-competitive effects.
4.3 Symmetric Countries
For the purposes of investigating the role played by the asymmetry between China and
the rest of the world, especially in terms of the differences in relative wage and produc-
tivity, we also estimate a symmetric-country case. The assumption of symmetric coun-
tries is often made in the literature because it allows greater tractability and requires less
data. Nevertheless, ignoring cross-country differences may obscure important gains from
trade. We demonstrate this point here.
35Under the 2004 parameters, domestic consumption share drops from 0:8855 to 0:7516 when trade cost
 falls from the 1995 level to the 2004 level. See Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) for a discussion on the
standard estimates of trade elasticities.
36Another way to understand the larger gains is to observe that the ACR formula becomes d lnW =
(1  )d ln  under the case of symmetric countries and no distortion. In this case, trade elasticity does not
matter. This formula does not hold in our model because (1) the countries are asymmetric so that there are
changes in terms of trade (and hence trade elasticity matters) and (2) there are distortions due to variable
markups. Even though d lnW Prod and d lnWACR are the same under  = 1 and close under  > 1, d lnWACR
would be higher in our model since our model implies a lower trade elasticity. Thus, reasons (1) and (2)
above actually correspond to the second and third sources of larger gains discussed here.
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The estimation results are shown in Table 7 and the counter-factual results in Table 8.
The changes in trade cost  , measure of goods  and number of entrants per product 
between 1995 and 2004 are all in the same direction as in the benchmark case. Note that
the estimated  is similar to a weighted average of estimated 1 and 2, with the ROW
weighted more heavily, since the ROW is much larger than China. Also, observe that
the fit of moments becomes significantly worse. This is because there are fewer parame-
ters in the symmetric-country estimation, reflecting the fact that the symmetric-country
estimation obscures the large discrepancy in entry and productivity distribution seen in
Table 2. It may also be partly because the symmetric-country model fails to reflect the
general equilibrium effect in the adjustment of relative wages, which change from 10:25
to 5:18 (See Table 2), meaning that Chinese wages relative to the ROW almost double in
this decade.
For counter-factual results, first note that the relative markup effect does not show
up in Table 8 because this term drops out under symmetric countries. Note that the
overall welfare gains become much smaller than the benchmark case (e.g. 2:4% versus
7:1%). Both components also become much smaller. However, the contribution of the
pro-competitive effect is still quite close to the benchmark case between 1995 and 2004.
In comparison with autarky, the contribution of the pro-competitive effect increases to
29:4%. As the distributions of the number of entrants and productivity draws become the
same between the two countries, the Ricardian gains are reduced because active firms’
productivity differences between two countries are now reduced. Moreover, not only do
the distribution of markups become similar, but the dispersion of markups also becomes
smaller. In fact, looking at autarky, we see that the allocative efficiency is much larger
in the symmetric-country case than in the benchmark case (0:938 versus 0:904). As the
allocative efficiency is larger to start with, it is not surprising that the gains in allocative
efficiency are smaller (0:5% versus 1:5% and 2:0% versus 6:0%). The same rationale ex-
plains why we see a pronounced diminishing-returns (dropping from 30:8% to 12:4%)
pattern in Panel B that is absent in the asymmetric-country case.
Under symmetric countries, the results in EMX rely on the cross-country productiv-
ity differences across different sectors to generate pro-competitive effects. However, our
exercise indicates that asymmetries between countries could also be important sources of
gains, both in the Ricardian component and the pro-competitive effects. Not finding these
gains in the symmetric-country implementation indicates the importance of asymmetric-
country quantification, especially when the country of concern is a developing one, such
as China. Our approach of using moments from both exporters and non-exporters proves
to be instrumental in such an implementation.
33
4.4 Effects of Other Parameters
In the previous subsections, we focus on the counter-factual exercises of trade cost. In
order to understand better the mechanism of the model and welfare results, here we study
the comparative statics of a variety of parameters.
First, we take a closed economy and consider what happens if population L doubles.
The scale effect here can be interpreted as going from autarky to full integration among
the countries. One quick result is that if the entry parameter  remains fixed, then there
is no effect on per capita welfare; only the total welfare scales up proportionally with
the population. However, it is reasonable to assume that  also scales up with L; as the
number of firms in a free-trade world is more than each autarkic economy. Based on 2004
parameters, the result is reported in the following table. We denote the change of welfare
by d lnW = lnW 0   lnW . Note that per capital welfare is W PCj  W Totalj =Lj and that there
is no relative markup effect for this exercise.
Here, we see that both per capita welfare and its components increase. As  increases,
there are more draws from the productivity distribution. Hence, there are gains due to
increased productivity because “the best” now becomes better. There are also gains in
allocative efficiency because of the compression of the ratio between the top two pro-
ductivities when there are more draws from a non-fat-tailed distribution.37 The gains in
allocative efficiency here are relatively modest compared with the gains due to enhanced
productivity.
L and  doubles  doubles
d lnW PC1 0:376 0:359
d lnW Prod1 0:324 0:387
d lnWA1 0:052  0:027
In the case where the standard deviation of log-productivity doubles, both per capita
welfare and productivity efficiency increase, but the allocative efficiency decreases. The
increase in productive efficiency is readily comprehensible. As  increases, not only does
it increase the mean, but the top productivity is increased even more as the dispersion at
the right-tail increases. In contrast, the increase in the dispersion at the right-tail enlarges
the ratio between the top two productivities, and thus increases markup dispersion and
reduces allocative efficiency. However, the effect on productive efficiency dominates and
thus per capita welfare still increases.
Next, we return to open economy, and consider symmetric countries for clarity. In the
previous subsection, we saw the effect of trade liberalization in the symmetric-country
37Holmes et al. (2014) highlight this result.
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case. Here, we seek to investigate the role of productivity dispersion () and the mean
number of draws (, which reflects market structure) on gains from trade. As such, we
replicate the exercise of gains from trade between 1995 and 2004, but under different
levels of  (Panel A of Table 9), as well as under different levels of  (Panel B of Table 9).
The middle columns of both panels are the same as that reported in panel A of Table 8.
Panel A shows that the larger the dispersion of the productivity distribution, the larger the
gains from trade in total and in productive efficiency. When the productivity draws are
more dispersed and hence more skewed to the right, the best productivity in each country
is therefore higher, increasing the gains from trade via productive efficiency. There are
always positive gains from trade via improved allocative efficiency, but the magnitude is
relatively stable. Thus, the contribution of allocative efficiency diminishes from as large
as 54:6% at 0:5 times 0, the standard deviation at 2004, to as small as 10:9% at 1:5 times
0.
In Panel B, gains from trade in total and the two components are all decreasing in
the level of . With a given distribution of productivity draws, the more draws suggest
that the top productivity and the ratio between the top two are both operating at a righter
part of the tail. The fact that the log-normal distribution is not fat-tailed implies that trade
liberalization induces smaller increases in the productivities of actual suppliers when  is
higher, because they were already quite high before trade liberalization. Also, when  is
higher, the same non-fat-tailed nature implies that trade liberalization induces a smaller
reduction in the ratio of the top two productivities because they were already small before
trade liberalization. The diminishing speed of these two components in  are roughly
the same, resulting in a relatively stable contribution of pro-competitive effects across
different ’s.
4.5 Robustness
We conduct four robustness checks. Recall that in the benchmark case, the counter-factual
analyses are based on 2004 estimates and change  back to the 1995 level. The first robust-
ness check is to conduct a counter-factual analysis based on 1995 estimates and change
 to the 2004 level. In our second check, we use an alternative measure of markups to
estimate the model and run counter-factuals. That is, by invoking the constant-returns-
to-scale assumption, we calculate raw markups by taking the ratio of revenue to total costs.
There were substantial trade surpluses in China in both 1995 and 2004. They account
for 2:25% of China’s manufacturing sales in 1995 and 2:63% in 2004. Our third check
is to accommodate trade imbalance in the model. To do this, we follow the literature
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by allowing an exogenous trade deficit Di for each country i with the requirement that
D1 + D2 = 0.38 With trade deficits, the total income in country i is Ri + Di. As China has
a trade surplus in both years, we can set here D2 = D > 0 and D1 =  D, where D is the
size of surplus in China. The details about the equilibrium conditions, the algorithm, and
the implementation of SMM of this modified model can be found in Appendix A3.
Another potential concern on our results is that substantial fraction of the Chinese
trade is intermediate goods and “processing”. In the benchmark, processing trade is in-
cluded in the total import and export when calculating the import and export shares. Our
fourth check is based on the export and import figures that exclude “processing trade”.
We first find the custom data on aggregate processing trade in each year. The processing-
trade export is higher than the import because the processing-trade imports are interme-
diate inputs, whereas exports add some value-added from domestic inputs (including
labor). Hence, we purge the processing-trade import from both total export and total im-
port, and re-calculate import and export shares. Further details and the SMM results are
given in Appendix A4.
The results are reported in Table 10. We omit the numbers of the level of total welfare
and its components, and simply report the corresponding percentage changes. The total
gains from trade between 1995 and 2004 range from 5:0% to 9:2%, and the contribution
of pro-competitive effects ranges from 13:1% to 32:1%, and that of allocative efficiency
ranges from 15:6% to 30:7%. These indicate that the importance of pro-competitive effects
remains similar, and the allocative efficiency still accounts for the bulk of gains from trade.
The only difference between the first robustness check and the benchmark is that all
parameters besides  are fixed at the 1995 levels instead of at the 2004 levels. The overall
gains become larger, but the pro-competitive effects remain similar. Next, note that the
 estimate under raw markups is about 1:81 in both years, which implies a smaller up-
per bound of markups and hence a smaller markup dispersion than the benchmark case.
So it is not surprising that the pro-competitive effects are slightly less important under
raw markups. The total gains from trade and the contribution from pro-competitive ef-
fects in the third robustness check are quite similar to the benchmark results in Table 5.39
In the fourth check, as the import and export shares decrease, the estimated trade costs
increase from 2:311 to 2:674 in 1995 and from 1:782 to 2:036 in 2004. However, the percent-
age decrease in trade cost between the two years remains similar to the benchmark case.
Compared with Table 5, the total welfare gains from trade are reduced, and this is likely
38For example, see Caliendo and Parro (2015).
39Autarky is inconsistent with trade imbalance; hence in this case there is no result for the counter-factual
based on autarky.
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due to the higher trade costs. However, the relative contributions of the pro-competitive
effects increases significantly (32% and 24%).
5 Multiple-Sector Economy
The framework in this paper can be easily extended to a multiple-sector economy, which
we do for three reasons. First, the model is more realistically matched to data, taking into
account the cross-sector heterogeneity in trade costs, as well as in productivity distribu-
tion, entry effort and preference parameters. Second, we conduct similar welfare analyses
to gauge the robustness of our previous results for this multiple-sector extension. Third,
exploiting the variations in sectoral markups and trade costs, we attempt to answer the
question of whether China liberalized the “right” sectors by examining whether there was
larger trade liberalization in sectors with higher initial markups in 1995.
5.1 Model and Estimation
5.1.1 Model Modification
There are S sectors, which are indexed by s = 1; 2; :::; S. The utility function of a repre-
sentative consumer is
U = Ss=1 (Qs)
s ;
where s 2 (0; 1),
PS
s=1 s = 1, andQs is the consumption of the composite good of sector
s given by a CES aggregator:
Qs =
Z !s
0
(qs;!)
s 1
s d!
 s
s 1
; for s > 1,
where s is the elasticity of substitution of sector s. The aggregate and sectoral price
indices are therefore
Pj = 
S
s=1

Pjs
s
s
Pjs 
Z !s
0
p1 sjs! d!
 1
1 s
:
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The Cobb-Douglas structure implies that PjsQjs = sRj , and country j’s total expenditure
of good s! is given by
Ejs! = sRj

pjs!
Pjs
1 s
 sRjjs!; (21)
and the total revenue of all firms at i in sector s is
Rs;i =
Z
fs!: 1(s!)=ig
sR11s!d! +
Z
fs!: 2(s!)=ig
sR22s!d!.
For each sector s, all the parameters in the one-sector economy now become sector-
specific. That is, for each sector s there is a  s and a s, and for sector s and country
i, there is a set fis; is; isg. For each sector, pricing and markups follow the previous
formulation.
5.1.2 Wages and General Equilibrium
For trade flows, observe that country j’s total import from country i is
Rj;i =
SX
s=1
Z
fs!: j (s!)=ig
Ejs!d! = Rjj;i
where j (s!) 2 f1; 2g denotes the source country for any particular good s! at destina-
tion j and j;i is the total spending share of j on i’s goods:
j;i =
SX
s=1
s
Z
fs!: j (s!)=ig
js!d!: (22)
The balanced trade condition R22;1 = R11;2 holds in equilibrium. The algorithm for
calculating an equilibrium in a multiple-sector economy is similar to the one-sector case.
From (23) and (24), we can derive the following formula for M sell1 and M sell2 :
M sell1 (w) =
"
SX
s=1
s
 Z
f!: s1(!)=1g
m 11s!1s!d! +
Z
f!: s2(!)=1g
m 12s!2s!
1;2
2;1
d!
!# 1
M sell2 (w) =
"
SX
s=1
s
 Z
f!: s1(!)=2g
m 11s!1s!
2;1
1;2
(w) d! +
Z
f!: s2(!)=2g
m 12s!2s!d!
!# 1
;
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in which j;i is the total spending share of j on i’s goods given in (22). Then, we still
calculate R1 (w) = M sell1 (w)L1, R2 (w) = M sell2 (w)wL2, and
R1 (w)
R2 (w)
=
M sell1 (w)
M sell2 (w)
L1
wL2
to pin down the relative wage w.
5.1.3 Welfare
The welfare of country i is decomposed in the same way as before:
W Totali = wiLi 
1
Ai
 M
sell
i
M
buy
i
 Ai M
buy
i
Pi
;
where
Ai = 
S
s=1

Ais
s
s
, Pi = Ss=1

Pis
s
s
;
M
buy
i =
 
SX
s=1
s

M
buy
is
 1! 1
, M selli =
Ri
wiLi
=
 
SX
s=1
Rs;i
Ri
 
M sellis
 1! 1
; (23)
and Ais, Pis, and M
buy
is are defined in the same way as before, and M
sell
is is
M sellis =
 Z
f!: s1(!)=ig
m 11s!
sR11s!
Rs;i
d! +
Z
f!: s2(!)=ig
m 12s!
sR22s!
Rs;i
d!
! 1
: (24)
The sectoral welfare cannot be further decomposed into the three components as in
the one-sector model. This breaks down because there is no simple analogue of Ri =
wiLi M selli at the sectoral level. Indeed, wiLi =
P
s
Ris
M sellis
.
5.1.4 Quantifying the Model
To quantify the model, we focus on 29 two-digit manufacturing sectors in the Chinese
Industrial Classifications (CIC).40 We first calibrate fsgSs=1. Recall that P1sQ1s = sR1.
We use information about expenditure share in China’s 1997 and 2002 input-output table
to calibrate st, where t = 1997; 2002. We then set s to be the average between two
40We include all 2-digit CIC manufacturing sectors except Sector 43 because we do not have the necessary
data to calculate markups for this industry.
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years.41 Given fR1; R2; wg and fsgSs=1, all of the moments used in Section 3.3 for each
sector can be computed using a similar procedure and with (21). Thus, we can estimate
the parameters sector by sector; this largely simplifies the estimation.
The parameter estimates are shown in Tables 11A and 11B. In both tables, we also
report the (unweighted) mean, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum of the es-
timates and percentage changes across sectors. There are substantial variations across
industries in their moments. The model performs well in accommodating these varia-
tions with corresponding variations in the estimates. The changes in the unweighted
means of parameters between 1995 and 2004 are consistent with the pattern observed in
the one-sector case for  ; ; 1; 1; and . In particular, all estimated trade costs decrease
except for Tobacco Processing and Food Processing.42 Also observe that the means of s
are 1:56 and 1:53, which are close to our benchmark in the one-sector economy, and s in
most industries (24 out of 29) are within one standard deviation from the means in both
years.
To further evaluate the performance of the multi-sector model, we examine variation
in the cross-sector entry parameter in China (1) and that of standard indicators for entry
frictions such as the SOE’s share of capital in the industry, the R&D expenditure (as a
proxy to sunk cost of entry), capital intensity (measured by capital labor ratio), and capital
distortion (measured by the standard deviation of ys!=ks!, where ys! and ks! are value
added and capital for an active firm s! in sector s).43 As these four variables capture
different aspects of entry friction in the Chinese economy, we regress 1 on these entry-
friction indicators jointly to examine the conditional correlation of each indicator with 1.
The result is given in Table 12. We pool the two years of estimates, and thus the number
of observations is 58. We report both cases where year fixed effects are controlled and
where both year and sector fixed effects are controlled. All entry-friction indicators but
the SOE share appear to be significantly correlated with 1, and carry the expected signs.
That is, the larger the entry friction indicator, the smaller the 1. This lends confidence
that 1 does reflect cross-sector variation in competition environment in China. The SOE
share does not carry the expected sign but is insignificant.
41Specifically, we first map the input-output code to 2-digit CIC sectors. Then, we calculate the expendi-
ture share for each 2-digit CIC sector, where the expenditure is calculated by subtracting exports from total
use, which already includes imports.
42This is mainly because the import and export shares decrease in these two sectors.
43We use this measure for capital distortion following the literature of factor misallocation à la Hsieh and
Klenow (2009). The R&D expenditure is not available in the Economic Census data, and we take it from
the Annual Surveys of Industrial Firms conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China during
1998–2007. The earliest year that the R&D expenditure data is available is 2001: we use this year’s data to
proxy 1995. The remaining three indicators are computed from the Economic Census data.
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From the one-sector analysis, welfare is closely (and negatively) related to the disper-
sion of markups. Even though there is no decomposition of welfare into three compo-
nents at the sectoral level, it is worthwhile examining how markup dispersion is corre-
lated with trade cost. In particular, if the reduction in sectoral trade cost is positively
correlated with the reduction of sectoral markup dispersion, then trade liberalization is
a possible cause for improving allocative efficiency. We examine the correlation between
the percentage change in estimated trade cost  s with changes in the following three mea-
sures of markup dispersion: standard deviation, coefficient of variation, and the Theil
index of markups. The respective correlations are 0:264, 0:242, and 0:241. The correlations
are indeed positive. While the correlations are not particularly strong, notice that the
identification of  s are mainly driven by sectoral trade moments rather than the markup
moments.44
5.2 Gains from Trade
When examining the welfare analysis in the multi-sector economy, we focus on the two
key counter-factuals shown in Table 13. Whereas we changed  in the one-sector econ-
omy, we now change f sg for all sectors s from the 2004 values to the 1995 values (or to
inhibitive values). The total gains from trade are 4:5% between 1995 and 2004 and 21:7%
from autarky. The contribution of pro-competitive effects here is around 21%, which is
quite close to the numbers in Table 5. Similarly, allocative efficiency accounts for almost
all of the pro-competitive effects.
5.3 Did China Liberalize the Right Sectors?
In this subsection, we try to answer the question of whether China liberalized the right
sectors. We examine the relationship between trade liberalization and sectoral consumers’
aggregate markup (M buy1s ) under the 1995 model. That is, if a sector has a higher M
buy
1s in
1995, do we also actually see a larger degree of trade liberalization between 1995 and
2004? The rationale is as follows. Recall from (23) that aggregate markup M buy1 is a har-
monic mean of sectoral markups (M buy1s ). From both one-sector and multi-sector welfare
analysis, we observe that most pro-competitive gains from trade are due to allocative ef-
ficiency. As the overall allocative efficiency depends on the dispersion of markups across
sectors, if a sector s has higher M buy1s initially, then allocative efficiency will improve more
44The general message here is similar to Lu and Yu (2015), who find that tariff reduction leads to re-
duced markup dispersion. Their exercise is different as they look for causality, they have controls, and they
examine manufacturing industries at a finer level.
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if the government targets its trade liberalization more in these higher markup sectors.
A quick examination is to rank the 29 sectors by their values ofM buy1s at 1995 and divide
them into two groups – the first being 15 sectors with the smaller values of M buy1s and the
second being those with the larger values. The revenue-weighted harmonic mean of the
M
buy
1s are then 1:22 and 1:35, respectively. The revenue-weighted mean of the changes in
trade costs  s are  0:162 and  0:690, respectively. An alternative measure of trade liber-
alization is the changes in sectoral import tariffs,45 which directly relate to the WTO entry
but do not account for other factors of trade liberalization. In this case, the corresponding
revenue-weighted mean of the changes in import tariff are  8:36 and  13:65 percentage
points, respectively. These simple statistics show a tendency where the higher the initial
level of sectoral markups, the larger the reduction in trade costs (or import tariffs).
Columns 1 and 5 of Table 14 show similar results by regressing the changes in sectoral
trade costs and in sectoral import tariffs on sectoral markups M buy1s at 1995.46 Note that
these descriptive results suffice for our purpose, as we seek only to examine whether
China on average liberalized the right sectors, smoothing the dispersion of markups
across sectors, even if this happened by chance. In other words, we do not attempt to
establish causality. Nevertheless, we also examine conditional correlations by following
Trefler (2004) in accounting for factors that may affect the changes in tariffs. Columns 3
and 7 show the results when we add controls for log of wage rates, employment, exports,
and imports, all at 1995. The rationale of these controls is that they are highly correlated
with various kinds of protectionism.47 As the share of SOEs is presumably a good indi-
cator of protectionism in China, we also add this as a control (see columns 2, 4, 6, and 8).
The above-mentioned tendency still remains.48
One often-mentioned merit of trade liberalization (or tariff reduction) is that it is an
easier route to reducing domestic protectionism compared with using domestic indus-
trial policies. Before joining the WTO, import tariffs varied greatly in China, but the WTO
conditions generally require larger tariff reductions in those industries with higher ini-
45The tariff data is obtained from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), which was developed by the
World Bank and incorporates trade data from various sources. In particular, we use TRAINS as it covers
more countries and more years. An observation of tariff is an average tariff at the HS 6-digit product level.
We use “effectively applied rates” (AHS). As WITS does not report China’s import tariffs in 1995, we take
averages of the 1994 and 1996 tariffs as proxies. In calculating sectoral import tariffs, we use the mapping
of HS 6-digit to CIC 2-digit manufacturing sectors using the concordance table from the National Bureau of
Statistics of China. For each sector, we then use imports in the corresponding product or industry from the
previous year (1994 and 2003) as weights to calculate average import tariffs.
46As sector-level data is grouped data from either firms or products, we weight the regressions by trade
volume and imports when the dependent variables are changes in trade cost and import tariffs, respectively.
47For a detailed explanation, see Trefler (2004), p. 878.
48All the coefficients on sectoral markup at 1995 are significant except in Column 2. As the sample size is
small (29), one should use caution when interpreting the significance levels.
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tial tariffs (see Lu and Yu 2015). We do not know whether the Chinese government had
benevolent motives and sought to enhance welfare; it could simply be a mechanical result
of China wanting to enter the WTO. In any case, our structural approach allows a wel-
fare assessment in the context of sectoral reallocation both in terms of improved overall
allocative efficiency (Table 13) and the results in this subsection.
6 Conclusion
Using Chinese firm-level data at 1995 and 2004, this paper studies pro-competitive effects
of trade quantitatively under head-to-head competition. The benchmark counter-factual
shows that total gains from such improved openness during this period is 7:1%. The pro-
competitive effects account for 19:9% of the total gains from trade from 1995 to 2004 and
21:5% from autarky to 2004. Allocative efficiency plays a much more important role than
the relative markup effect.
For small changes in trade costs in each estimated model at 1995 and 2004, the total
gains from trade are larger than the gains predicted by the ACR formula by 31% and
13%, respectively. The total gain from the change in trade cost between 1995’s and 2004’s
levels is 20:3% larger than the ACR formula. These additional gains are mostly from pro-
competitive effects. This is a result that is absent in models when a firm monopolizes a
variety, such as in Arkolakis et al. (2018), EMX, Feenstra and Weinstein (2016), and other
monopolistic competitive models. Head-to-head competition is the main reason driving
this difference, as explained in Sections 2.6 and 4.2.
The total gains from trade are relatively large compared with other estimates in the lit-
erature. Beside the fact that there is a large reduction in trade cost during this period, the
two channels for the larger gains are the above-mentioned finding that pro-competitive
effects increase the total gains and the lower trade elasticities in our estimated models as
discussed in Section 4.2. Both channels are important.
We find that the gains from trade and its components are substantially smaller in the
symmetric-country case compared with the benchmark case, indicating the important
role played by the differences in productivities and markups across countries. The fact
that the symmetric-country implementation may obscure sizable gains from trade indi-
cates the importance of implementing asymmetric-country estimation, especially when
the country of concern is a developing one, such as China. Our approach of separating
moments from exporters and non-exporters proves to be instrumental in such an imple-
mentation.
How can one think about policy in this model? In our model, 1 (mean number of
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draws) reflects domestic industrial/competition policy, but from a welfare point of view,
decreasing trade cost  is similar to increasing 1. In particular, from autarky to a fully
integrated world, 1 increases without changing any domestic industrial/competition
policy. If both trade policy and domestic industrial policy are tools that a government can
use, which one to use depends on the relative benefits and costs of implementing these
policies.
Exploiting the variations in sectoral markups and trade costs, we find that China on
average liberalized the “right” sectors in the sense that the dispersion of markups is re-
duced because there tended to be larger trade liberalization in sectors with higher initial
markups. Even though we do not know exactly how this happened, to target trade lib-
eralization in sectors with higher markups is a useful take-away. This is particularly so
when it is difficult to eliminate distortions in some industries via domestic measures.
Appendix
A1. Estimation of Markups
In this subsection, we provide the details for calculating firm markups using DLW’s
method. Specifically, we assume that firm i at time t has the following production tech-
nology49
Qit = Fit (Lit; Kit;Mit; !it) ; (25)
where Lit, Kit, and Mit are the inputs of labor, capital, and intermediate materials, respec-
tively; !it denotes firm-specific productivity. The production function F (:) is assumed to
be continuous and twice-differentiable with respect to all of its arguments.
Consider the following cost minimization problem firm i faces at time t:
min
fLit;Kit;Mitg
witLit + ritKit + p
m
itMit (26)
s:t: Fit (Lit; Kit;Mit; !it)  Qit;
where wit, rit, and pmit denote the wage rate, rental price of capital and the price of inter-
mediate inputs, respectively; Qit is a given number of output.
The estimation of firm-level markup hinges on choosing an input that is free of any
adjustment costs, and the estimation of its output elasticity. As labor is largely not freely
49Note that the framework is robust to any arbitrary number of inputs. As we observe only three in-
puts (i.e., labor, capital and intermediate materials) in our data, here we focus on production technology
involving only these three inputs.
44
chosen in China (particularly state-owned enterprises) and capital is often considered a
dynamic input (which makes its output elasticity difficult to interpret), we choose inter-
mediate materials as the input to estimate firm markup (see also DLW). Specifically, the
Lagrangian function associated with the optimization problem (26) can be written as
L (Lit; Kit;Mit; it; it) = witLit + ritKit + pmitMit
+it [Qit   Fit (Lit; Kit;Mit; !it)] :
Hence, the first-order condition for intermediate materials is
@L
@Mit
= pmit   it
@Fit
@Mit
= 0: (27)
Rearranging equation (27) and multiplying both sides by Mit
Qit
yield
@Fit
@Mit
Mit
Qit
=
1
it
pmitMit
Qit
=
Pit
it
pmitMit
PitQit
; (28)
where Pit is the price of the final good.
Note that it = @L@Qit = mcit represents the marginal cost of production at a given level
of output. Define firm markup it as the ratio of price over marginal cost, i.e. it  Pitmcit =
Pit
it
. Hence, equation (28) leads to the following estimation expression of firm markup:50
it = 
m
it (
m
it )
 1 ; (29)
where mit  @Fit@Mit MitQit is the output elasticity of intermediate materials and mit 
pmitMit
PitQit
is
the share of the expenditure of intermediate materials in total revenue.
As the information about the expenditure on intermediate materials and total rev-
enue is available in the data, mit can be readily calculated. However, the output elasticity
of intermediate materials, mit , must be obtained by estimating the production function
(25). There is a large literature on the estimation of the production function focusing on
how to control for unobserved productivity shocks (for a review, see Ackerberg, Benkard,
Berry, and Pakes 2007). Solutions include instrumental variable estimation, GMM estima-
tion, and the control function approach proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). We adopt
50Note that this expression holds under any form of market competition and demand function. Specif-
ically, DLW discuss some alternative market structures, which lead to a similar estimation expression for
firm markup. These alternative market structures include Cournot competition, Bertrand competition, and
monopolistic competition.
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the control function approach developed by Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazier (2006), which
comprises a two-step estimation.
Similar to DLW, we assume a translog production function when estimating markups.
Specifically, the production function to be estimated is expressed as
qit = llit + kkit + mmit + lll
2
it + kkk
2
it + mmm
2
it
+lklitkit + kmkitmit + lmlitmit
+lkmlitkitmit + !it + "it; (30)
where the lowercase letters represent the logarithm of the uppercase letters, !it is firm-
specific productivity, and "it is an i.i.d. error term. = (l; k; m; ll; kk; mm; lk; km; lm; lkm)
is the vector of production function coefficients.
To proxy !it, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) assume that
mit = mt (kit; !it; exit) ;
where exit denotes the exporter status (i.e. taking value 1 if exporters and 0 otherwise).
Given the monotonicity of mt (:), we have
!it = ht (mit; kit; exit) :
In the first stage, we estimate the following equation
qit = it + "it;
where
it = llit + kkit + mmit + lll
2
it + kkk
2
it + mmm
2
it
+lklitkit + kmkitmit + lmlitmit + lkmlitkitmit + ht (mit; kit; exit) ;
and obtain the estimates of the expected output (^it) and the error term ("^it).
Meanwhile, to recover all the production function coefficients  in the second stage,
we model firm productivity as following a first-order Markov movement, i.e.
!it = gt (!it 1) + it;
where it is an idiosyncratic shock.
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From the first stage, the productivity for any given value of  can be computed as
!it () = ^it  
 
llit + kkit + mmit + lll
2
it + kkk
2
it + mmm
2
it
+lklitkit + kmkitmit + lmlitmit + lkmlitkitmit
!
:
The idiosyncratic shock to productivity given , it (), can then be obtained through a
non-parametric regression of !it () on !it 1 ().
To identify the coefficients of the production function, Ackerberg, Caves, and Fra-
zier (2006) assume that capital is determined one period beforehand and hence is not
correlated with it (). Meanwhile, wage rates and prices of intermediate materials are
assumed to vary across firms and be serially correlated.
Therefore, the moment conditions used to estimate the coefficients of the production
function are
E (it ()Y
0
it) = 0;
whereYit = flit 1; l2it 1;mit 1;m2it 1; kit; k2it; lit 1mit 1; lit 1kit;mit 1kit; lit 1mit 1kitg.
We estimate the translog production function (30) separately for each 2-digit industry
using the Annual Survey of Manufacturing Firms conducted by the NBS from 1998 to
2005. Specifically, we use the logarithm of sales deflated by 2-digit ex-factory price indices
to measure qit, the logarithm of employment to measure lit, the logarithm of the net value
of fixed assets deflated by investment price indices to measure kit, and the logarithm of
intermediate materials51 deflated by input price indices to measuremit; both price indices
are provided by Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012).
Once ^ =

^l; ^k; ^m; ^ll; ^kk; ^mm; ^lk; ^km; ^lm; ^lkm

is obtained, we can readily cal-
culate the firm markup using equation (29), i.e.
^it = ^
m
it (
m
it )
 1 ;
where ^
m
it = ^m + 2^mmmit + ^lmlit + ^kmkit + ^lmklitkit. Production estimates are reported
in Table A1.
51The value of intermediate materials is calculated as (production costs) (total wages) (total welfare
benefits) (current-year depreciation)(production costs)=(production costs+selling costs+administrative
costs+financial costs).
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A2. Welfare Gains by the ACR Formula with Large Change in Trade
Cost
We first calculate
ln
WACR,2004j
WACR,1995j
=
Z 2004
1995
d lnWACRj () =
Z 2004
1995
d

ln vjj ()
 ()

:
To numerically calculate the above, we discretize the interval of [ 2004;  1995] via the use of
an n-grid such that  0 =  1995,  1 =  1995   1995 2004n ,...,  i =  1995   i  1995 2004n ,..., and
n =  2004. The ACR formula for this large change in trade cost is thus calculated by
ln
WACR,2004j
WACR,1995j

nX
i=1
1
i
[ln vjj ( i)  ln vjj ( i 1)] :
We calculate vjj ( i) precisely at  i, and we calculate the trade elasticity i on each i-th
grid using the two-point formula mentioned in footnote 28 at  =  i 1+ i
2
. For our nu-
merical calculation, we use n = 50 so that the grid size is (2:311  1:782) =50 = 0:01058.
Once we obtain ln

WACR,2004j
WACR,1995j

, we can then calculate the percentage increase in welfare
WACR,2004j
WACR,1995j
  1

 100%.
A3. Computation in the Model with Trade Imbalance
To model trade imbalance, we follow the literature by allowing an exogenous trade deficit
Di for each country i with the requirement that D1 +D2 = 0. The total income in country
i is therefore Yi = Ri + Di. As China has a trade surplus in both years, we can set here
D2 = D > 0 and D1 =  D, where D is the size of surplus in China.
Observe that the total imports of country j from country i is
Rj;i =
Z
f!: j (!)=ig
Ej!d! = Yj
Z
f!: j (!)=ig

pj!
Pj
1 
d!  Yjj;i: (31)
where j (!) 2 f1; 2g denotes the source country for any particular good ! at destina-
tion j and j;i denote the spending share of country j’s consumers on the goods pro-
duced in i. The previous balanced trade condition (9) is now modified as (R2 +D)2;1 =
(R1  D)1;2 +D, or equivalently,
R22;1 = R11;2 +D
 
2;2   1;2

. (32)
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The algorithm for computing equilibrium is more complicated than the benchmark
model. First, observe from the definition of the producers’ aggregate markup for country
1:
M sell1 =
R1
w1L1
=
R
f!: 1(!)=1g 1!Y1d! +
R
f!: 2(!)=1g 2!Y2d!R
f!: 1(!)=1gm
 1
1!1!Y1d! +
R
f!: 2(!)=1gm
 1
2!2!Y2d!
=
 Z
f!: 1(!)=1g
m 11!
1! (R1  D)
R1
d! +
Z
f!: 2(!)=1g
m 12!
2! (R2 +D)
R1
d!
! 1
=
 
R1  D
R1
Z
f!: 1(!)=1g
m 11!1!d! +
1;2 +
D
R1
1;1
2;1
Z
f!: 2(!)=1g
m 12!2!d!
! 1
(33)
Recall that j;i =
R
f!: j (!)=ig j!d! depends only on relative wage w, but not on R1 and
R2. Hence, M sell1 becomes a function of w and R1 only. For any given R1 and w, we can
calculate M sell1 (w;R1). Then, with w1 = 1, we can plug R1 = M sell1 (w;R1)L1 into (33) and
solve for M sell1 (w). We have
M sell1 (w) =
L1  D
h
1 1;2
2;1
R
f!: 2(!)=1gm
 1
2!2!d!  
R
f!: 1(!)=1gm
 1
1!1!d!
i
L1
hR
f!: 1(!)=1gm
 1
1!1!d! +
1;2
2;1
R
f!: 2(!)=1gm
 1
2!2!d!
i :
With R1 = M sell1 (w)L1, we use (32) again to calculate R2 (w):
R2 (w) = R1 (w)
1;2
2;1
+D

1  1;2
2;1
  1

:
Next, we calculate
M sell2 (w) =
 
R1 (w) D
R2 (w)
Z
f!: 1(!)=2g
m 11!1!d! +
R2 (w) +D
R2 (w)
Z
f!: 2(!)=2g
m 12!2!d!
! 1
;
Finally, given L2, we can use the market clearing condition of country 2 to solve for w:
M sell2 (w) =
R2 (w)
wL2
:
Given the solution of w, equilibrium R1 and R2 can be obtained using the above proce-
dure. The SMM result of the modified model is presented in Table A2.
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A4. SMM Results Considering Processing Trade
When considering processing trade, the only changes from the benchmark SMM proce-
dure are the import and export shares. From the custom data, we first obtain the fraction
of processing-trade import in total import. We then use the formula for import and ex-
port shares, as well as R1 given in Table 2, to re-calculate export and import shares. The
new numbers for 1995 are 0:073 and 0:096 for import and export shares, respectively. The
corresponding numbers for 2004 are 0:135 and 0:162. The SMM results are given in Table
A3.
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Figure 1: Markup Distributions (1995 versus 2004)
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Year 1995 2004 1995 2004 1995 2004
Mean 1.428 1.372 1.340 1.318 1.432 1.379
Std. dev. 0.495 0.479 0.431 0.438 0.498 0.483
p1 1.005 1.004 1.003 1.004 1.005 1.004
p5 1.022 1.019 1.017 1.017 1.023 1.019
p10 1.044 1.036 1.034 1.032 1.045 1.037
p25 1.114 1.091 1.084 1.077 1.116 1.093
p50 1.262 1.207 1.120 1.168 1.266 1.213
p75 1.538 1.437 1.414 1.362 1.544 1.447
p90 2.015 1.893 1.784 1.747 2.023 1.909
p95 2.464 2.379 2.199 2.183 2.475 2.400
p99 3.528 3.509 3.299 3.364 3.537 3.523
Table 1: Detailed Markup Distributions 
All firms Exporters Non-exporters
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Predetermined
w Relative wages (the ROW to China)
R1 China's manufacturing sales ($b)
R2 ROW's manufacturing sales ($b)
Moments for SMM Data Model Data Model
import share 0.130 0.148 0.222 0.252
export share 0.153 0.176 0.249 0.273
relative number of firms 0.210 0.193 0.596 0.605
fraction of exporters 0.044 0.023 0.105 0.064
mean cost share for exporters 0.845 0.802 0.801 0.789
std  of cost share for exporters 0.135 0.135 0.142 0.139
p50 markup for exporters 1.196 1.207 1.168 1.224
p95 markup for exporters 2.199 2.173 2.183 2.207
p99 markup for exporters 3.299 3.202 3.364 3.225
mean cost share for non-exporters 0.789 0.715 0.829 0.763
std of cost share for non-exporters 0.147 0.185 0.139 0.161
p50  markup for non-exporters 1.266 1.383 1.213 1.285
p95  markup for non-exporters 2.475 2.752 2.400 2.193
p99 markup for nonexporters 3.537 3.202 3.523 2.735
Estimates s.e. Estimates s.e. 
2.311 0.027 1.782 0.007
0.186 0.002 0.659 0.003
2.455 0.037 2.618 0.017
5.535 0.037 5.024 0.048
-2.397 0.023 -1.756 0.012
0.450 0.004 0.425 0.002
0.351 0.022 0.357 0.011
σ, elasticity of substitution 1.454 0.003 1.449 0.003
Simulated R2/R1 Data Model Data Model
R2/R1 10.234 9.388 6.289 5.875
η_2, std of log productivity, ROW
Notes: All units, if any, are in billions USD, current price. The import share is the import penetration ratio, i.e. IM/(R1-EX+IM), 
and the export share is the total export divided by the same denominator. All the cost share moments are weighted by firms' 
revenues. Recall that a firm's cost share is the inverse of its markup. p# denotes the #-th percentile.
14,737,500
μ_1, mean of log productivity, China relative to ROW
η_1, std of log productivity, China
λ_1, Poisson parameter, China
λ_2, Poisson parameter, ROW
Parameter values
τ, trade cost
γ, measure of goods relative to total_goods_baseline
9,397,500
918,291 2,343,328
Table 2: SMM Results
1995 2004
10.25 5.18
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moments τ γ λ_1 λ_2 μ_1 η_1 η_2 σ
import share -0.409 0.005 -0.072 0.001 -0.251 -0.019 0.554 -0.030
export share -0.742 0.003 0.082 -0.101 0.966 0.665 -0.204 -0.026
relative number of firms 0.252 0.971 0.102 -0.015 0.429 0.179 -0.769 0.000
fraction of exporters -0.167 0.001 0.006 -0.018 0.130 0.167 0.012 0.000
mean cost share for exporters -0.031 -0.001 0.023 0.012 0.040 -0.140 -0.034 0.021
std  of cost share for exporters 0.022 0.003 -0.016 -0.016 -0.041 -0.152 0.062 -0.050
p50 markup for exporters 0.055 -0.006 -0.033 -0.016 -0.052 0.269 0.010 0.006
p95 markup for exporters 1.597 -0.408 -1.949 -0.556 -2.088 -13.072 1.419 -0.070
p99  markup for exporters 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -5.107
mean cost share for non-exporters -0.088 -0.003 0.021 0.002 -0.063 -0.360 0.089 0.014
std of cost share for non-exporters 0.054 0.003 -0.008 -0.001 0.030 0.175 -0.023 -0.010
p50  markup for non-exporters 0.154 0.011 -0.044 -0.005 0.141 0.639 -0.173 0.000
p95  markup for non-exporters 0.929 -0.004 -0.159 -0.027 0.660 2.973 -0.480 0.000
p99  markup for non-exporters 1.914 0.055 -0.205 -0.067 0.880 3.636 -0.491 -0.877
Table 3: Jacobian Matrix
Notes: Each entry of this table gives the rate of change of a moment to a parameter. This is based on the 
benchmark estimation of the 2004 model. The larger the absolute value of the rate of change, the more sensitive 
this moment is to the parameter, and the more useful this moment is in identifying this parameter.
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Moments for SMM Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
import share 0.222 0.252 0.222 0.228 0.222 0.187 0.222 0.229
export share 0.249 0.273 0.249 0.256 0.249 0.254 0.249 0.244
relative number of firms 0.596 0.605 0.596 0.517
fraction of exporters 0.105 0.064 0.105 0.049 0.105 0.107 0.105 0.049
mean cost share for exporters 0.801 0.789 0.801 0.737 0.801 0.793 0.801 0.781
std  of cost share for exporters 0.142 0.139 0.142 0.161 0.142 0.073 0.142 0.070
p50 markup for exporters 1.168 1.224 1.168 1.288 1.168 1.288 1.168 1.240
p95 markup for exporters 2.183 2.207 2.183 2.390 2.183 1.389 2.183 1.381
p99 markup for exporters 3.364 3.225 3.364 3.240 3.364 1.389 3.364 1.381
mean cost share for non-exporters 0.829 0.763 0.829 0.805 0.829 0.793 0.829 0.841
std of cost share for non-exporters 0.139 0.161 0.139 0.151 0.139 0.093 0.139 0.098
p50  markup for non-exporters 1.213 1.285 1.213 1.192 1.213 1.342 1.213 1.158
p95  markup for non-exporters 2.400 2.193 2.400 1.977 2.400 1.389 2.400 1.381
p99 markup for non-exporters 3.523 2.735 3.523 2.548 3.523 1.389 3.523 1.381
mean of export intensity 0.408 0.538 0.408 0.573
std of export intensity 0.482 0.072 0.482 0.070
size advantage of exporters 5.682 2.747 5.682 5.827
productivity advantage of exporters 1.275 1.507 1.275 2.098
std of log productivity 0.696 0.356 0.696 0.293
std of log of domestic sales 1.444 0.844 1.444 0.620
Parameter values Estimates s.e. Estimates s.e. Estimates s.e. Estimates s.e. 
τ, trade cost 1.782 0.007 1.809 0.004
γ, relative measure of goods 0.659 0.003 0.634 0.005
λ_1, Poisson parameter, China 2.618 0.017 2.000 0.052
λ_2, Poisson parameter, ROW 5.024 0.048 3.940 0.032
μ_1, mean -1.756 0.012 -1.763 0.009
η_1, std of log productivity, China 0.425 0.002 0.471 0.002
η_2, std of log productivity, ROW 0.357 0.011 0.398 0.007
σ, elasticity of substitution 1.449 0.003 1.447 0.006 3.572 0.007 3.624 0.010
θ, Frechet shape parameter 3.669 0.010 4.388 0.011
Notes: All the units, if any, are in billions USD, current price. The estimation is based on the 2004 data. The m14 columns are taken 
from Table 2. 
First Set of Comparisons Second Set of Comparisons
Table 4: Comparison with the BEJK Model
m13_BEJKm14 m19_BEJKm20
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Under 2004 
estimates τ at 1995 % change Autarky % change
τ, trade cost 1.782 2.311 1,000,000
Welfare
Total Welfare 2.12E+12 1.98E+12 7.1% 1.66E+12 28.0%
W_Prod 2.21E+12 2.09E+12 5.6% 1.83E+12 20.7%
W_A 0.958 0.944 1.5% 0.904 6.0%
W_R 1.000 1.000 -0.1% 1.000 0.0%
Contribution to total welfare 
W_A and W_R 19.9% 21.5%
W_A 20.6% 21.6%
Autarky
10% import 
share
% change 
from autarky
20% import 
share
% change 
from 10% 
import share
τ, trade cost 1,000,000 2.424 1.916
Welfare
Total Welfare 1.66E+12 1.96E+12 18.4% 2.07E+12 5.6%
W_Prod 1.83E+12 2.08E+12 13.6% 2.17E+12 4.2%
W_A 0.904 0.942 4.2% 0.954 1.3%
W_R 1.000 1.000 0.0% 1.000 0.0%
Contribution to total welfare 
W_A and W_R 23.1% 23.5%
W_A 22.9% 24.2%
Panel B: Counter-factual from autarky
Notes: In Panel A, all the analysis is done under 2004 estimates, and only the trade cost (τ) changes. 
The reported percentage changes in this panel are under the changes from the corresponding τ to 
2004's τ. Panel B reports results when τ is changed from an inhibitive level (autarky) to the level that 
entails 10%, and then from 10% to 20%, with other parameters fixed at the 2004 estimates.
Panel A: Counter-factual from 2004 estimates
Table 5: Counter-factual Analysis
60
Total 
Welfare 
Gains
Gains in 
Productive 
Efficieny
Pro-
competitive
Gains
Contribution 
of Pro-
competitive 
Effects
Trade 
Elasticity
Gains by the 
ACR 
formula
Additional 
gains over 
the ACR 
formula
1995 0.249 0.191 0.058 23.2% -2.85 0.190 31.3%
2004 0.362 0.289 0.073 20.3% -3.30 0.320 13.0%
Table 6: Welfare Analysis Local to the Estimated Model and Comparison with the 
ACR Formula
Notes: All the welfare gains here are calculated in terms of welfare elasticity to trade cost, i.e., dln(W)/dln(tau), 
where W could be total welfare or its components, or the one according to the ACR formula. For both the 1995 
and 2004 models, we calculate the welfare gains and its components from estimated tau to the case where 
ln(tau')=ln(tau)-h, where h = 0.0001. To reduce secant error in calculating trade elasticity, we use two-point 
formula: f'(x) = (f(x+h)-f(x-h))/2h, and here x=ln(tau21) and f = ln((1-v11)/v11). As in ACR, the trade elasticity 
calculated here is partial, i.e., wages are fixed at the initial equilibrium.
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Predetermined
w Relative wages (the ROW to China)
R1 China's manufacturing sales ($b)
R2 ROW's manufacturing sales ($b)
Moments Data Model Data Model
import share 0.130 0.049 0.222 0.117
export share 0.153 0.047 0.249 0.114
relative number of firms 0.210 0.205 0.596 0.627
fraction of exporters 0.044 0.058 0.105 0.138
mean cost share for exporters 0.845 0.721 0.801 0.717
std  of cost share for exporters 0.135 0.151 0.142 0.151
p50 markup for exporters 1.196 1.398 1.168 1.394
p95 markup for exporters 2.199 2.255 2.183 2.239
p99 markup for exporters 3.299 3.604 3.364 3.018
mean cost share for non-exporters 0.789 0.758 0.829 0.772
std of cost share for non-exporters 0.147 0.171 0.139 0.161
p50  markup for non-exporters 1.266 1.286 1.213 1.262
p95  markup for non-exporters 2.475 2.372 2.400 2.168
p99  markup for non-exporters 3.537 3.377 3.523 2.794
Estimate s.e. Estimate s.e.
2.376 0.006 1.876 0.003
0.174 0.001 0.573 0.002
4.217 0.033 4.893 0.069
η, std. of log productivity 0.438 0.004 0.495 0.003
1.384 0.003 1.353 0.019
Notes: All the units, if any, are in billions USD, current price. For the detailed definition of moments, see Table 2. 
λ, Poisson parameter
σ, elasticity of substitution
Parameter values
τ, trade cost
γ/   , measure of goods relative to 
918291 2343328
Table 7: SMM Results (Symmetric Countries)
1995 2004
1.0 1.0
918291 2343328
62
Under 2004 
estimates τ at 1995 % change Autarky % change
τ, trade cost 1.876 2.376 1,000,000
Welfare
Total Welfare 3.50E+16 3.42E+16 2.4% 3.28E+16 6.7%
W_Prod 3.66E+16 3.59E+16 1.9% 3.50E+16 4.7%
W_A 0.957 0.952 0.5% 0.938 2.0%
Contribution to total welfare 
W_A 19.4% 29.4%
Autarky
10% import 
share
% change 
from autarky
20% import 
share
% change 
from 10% 
import share
τ, trade cost 1,000,000 1.970 1.550
Welfare
Total Welfare 3.28E+16 3.48E+16 6.1% 3.62E+16 4.0%
W_Prod 3.50E+16 3.64E+16 4.1% 3.77E+16 3.5%
W_A 0.938 0.956 1.9% 0.960 0.5%
Contribution to total welfare 
W_A 30.8% 12.4%
Panel B: Counter-factual from autarky
Notes: Under symmetric countries, W_R = 1. In Panel A, all the analysis is done under 2004 estimates, 
and only the trade cost (τ) changes. The reported percentage changes in this panel are under the 
changes from the corresponding τ to 2004's τ. Panel B reports results when τ is changed from an 
inhibitive level (autarky) to the level that entails 10%, and then from 10% to 20%, with other 
parameters fixed at the 2004 estimates.
Panel A: Counter-factual from 2004 estimates
Table 8: Counter-factual Analysis (Symmetric Countries)
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η 0.5×η₀ 0.75×η₀ η₀=0.407 1.25×η₀ 1.5×η₀
Total Welfare 0.5% 1.2% 2.4% 3.5% 4.4%
W_Prod 0.2% 0.9% 1.9% 2.9% 3.9%
W_A 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
Contribution of  
W_A
54.6% 29.4% 19.8% 14.5% 10.9%
λ 0.5×λ₀ 0.75×λ₀ λ₀=4.219 1.25×λ₀ 1.5×λ₀
Total Welfare 4.6% 3.2% 2.4% 1.9% 1.6%
W_Prod 3.7% 2.5% 1.9% 1.5% 1.3%
W_A 0.9% 0.7% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3%
Contribution of  
W_A
19.0% 20.6% 19.7% 17.6% 16.8%
Table 9: Comparative Statics of Other Parameters
Panel A: Comparative Statics of η on Gains from Trade 
Panel B: Comparative Statics of λ on Gains from Trade 
Notes: Under symmetric countries, W_R = 1. In both panels, the analyses are done 
under 2004 estimates, and only the trade cost (τ) is changed to the level at 1995. 
The reported percentage increases in welfare are under the change from 1995'τ to 
2004's τ. The contribution of allocative efficiency is the ratio of the percentage 
increase in allocative efficiency to that of total welfare.
Gains from Trade (in percentage)
Gains from Trade  (in percentage)
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Total Welfare W_Prod W_A W_R W_A and W_R W_A
% change from τ at 
1995 to τ at 2004  
9.2% 7.3% 1.7% 0.1% 19.2% 18.2%
% change from 
autarky to τ at 1995
23.8% 18.0% 5.0% -0.1% 20.6% 20.9%
Total Welfare W_Prod W_A W_R W_A and W_R W_A
% change from τ at 
1995 to τ at 2004  
5.0% 4.3% 0.8% -0.1% 13.1% 15.6%
% change from 
autarky to τ at 2004
14.1% 11.6% 2.5% -0.2% 16.3% 17.8%
Total Welfare W_Prod W_A W_R W_A and W_R W_A
% change from τ at 
1995 to τ at 2004  
7.2% 5.6% 1.6% 0.0% 21.1% 21.7%
Total Welfare W_Prod W_A W_R W_A and W_R W_A
% change from τ at 
1995 to τ at 2004  
5.1% 3.4% 1.6% 0.1% 32.1% 30.7%
% change from 
autarky to τ at 2004
21.1% 15.2% 5.0% 0.2% 24.4% 23.7%
Notes: In the first robustness check, the analysis is based on the 1995 estimate and we change τ to the 2004 level. In the 
next three robustness checks, analyses are done based on 2004 estimates, as in the benchmark case.
Contribution to total welfare Welfare
Robustness Check 4: Under Alternative Estimates when Processing Trade is Considered
Welfare Contribution to total welfare 
Robustness Check 3: Model with Trade Imbalance
Welfare Contribution to total welfare 
Table 10: Robustness Check of Counter-factual Analyses
Robustness Check 1: Based on 1995 Estimates
Welfare Contribution to total welfare 
Robustness Check 2: Under Raw Markups
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cic2d Industry definition α 1995 2004 % change 1995 2004 % change 1995 2004 % change 1995 2004 % change 1995 2004 % change
13 Food processing 0.049 1.693 1.814 7.2 0.016 0.033 111.5 1.974 2.289 15.9 25.6 16.6 -35.2 1.57 1.96 24.9
14 Food manufacturing 0.017 1.577 1.366 -13.4 0.007 0.011 63.5 3.994 2.534 -36.6 17.5 9.9 -43.6 3.40 2.31 -32.1
15 Beverage manufacturing 0.014 1.453 1.416 -2.6 0.005 0.009 84.8 5.374 3.992 -25.7 25.3 7.7 -69.8 4.29 3.71 -13.5
16 Tobacco processing 0.014 1.466 1.374 -6.3 0.000 0.000 -10.8 5.365 5.394 0.5 37.9 9.8 -74.3 3.89 4.91 26.3
17 Textile industry 0.059 1.688 1.443 -14.5 0.012 0.036 199.9 1.797 1.601 -10.9 19.7 7.6 -61.4 1.50 1.49 -0.9
18 Garments & other fiber products 0.023 1.566 1.482 -5.4 0.007 0.019 166.8 3.098 2.869 -7.4 10.8 9.2 -15.0 2.80 2.63 -6.0
19 Leather, furs, down & related products 0.016 1.541 1.416 -8.1 0.004 0.010 150.0 1.852 1.694 -8.5 9.9 5.5 -44.3 1.69 1.61 -4.7
20
Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm 
fiber & straw products
0.011 1.453 1.477 1.6 0.008 0.019 126.2 2.098 1.643 -21.7 7.8 2.6 -67.1 1.95 1.60 -17.7
21 Furniture manufacturing 0.008 1.446 1.283 -11.3 0.004 0.010 146.6 2.535 1.928 -23.9 8.3 1.0 -88.0 2.34 1.91 -18.4
22 Papermaking & paper products 0.020 1.780 1.512 -15.1 0.006 0.020 237.7 2.545 2.034 -20.1 23.7 4.0 -83.0 2.06 1.95 -5.0
23 Printing industry 0.009 1.417 1.293 -8.7 0.008 0.020 144.3 2.603 2.373 -8.9 5.3 0.9 -83.5 2.47 2.35 -4.9
24 Cultural, educational & sports goods 0.007 1.361 1.395 2.5 0.002 0.006 275.4 2.051 1.794 -12.5 4.1 1.5 -64.3 1.97 1.77 -10.3
25 Petroleum processing & coking 0.050 1.338 1.744 30.3 0.001 0.004 300.1 1.740 1.513 -13.0 8.6 5.0 -42.2 1.60 1.44 -10.0
26
Raw chemical materials & chemical 
products
0.072 1.649 1.489 -9.7 0.012 0.038 218.3 2.108 1.786 -15.3 14.6 7.2 -51.0 1.84 1.67 -9.4
27 Medical & pharmaceutical products 0.017 1.584 1.277 -19.4 0.003 0.004 42.0 3.553 2.916 -17.9 6.9 3.8 -44.9 3.32 2.81 -15.5
28 Chemical fiber 0.010 2.414 2.412 -0.1 0.000 0.002 242.6 2.920 2.186 -25.1 22.0 4.9 -77.7 2.39 2.08 -12.9
29 Rubber products 0.010 1.284 1.523 18.6 0.002 0.007 238.6 1.771 1.707 -3.6 20.2 11.0 -45.6 1.47 1.54 4.4
30 Plastic products 0.027 1.795 1.494 -16.7 0.008 0.030 276.2 1.714 1.713 -0.1 13.9 5.4 -61.0 1.50 1.62 8.0
31 Nonmetal mineral products 0.050 1.595 1.429 -10.4 0.024 0.063 160.3 4.588 2.388 -48.0 12.8 5.9 -54.0 4.07 2.25 -44.6
32 Smelting & pressing of ferrous metals 0.092 1.522 2.137 40.4 0.003 0.009 180.0 2.028 2.326 14.7 10.9 4.9 -55.2 1.83 2.22 21.3
33 Smelting & pressing of nonferrous metals 0.031 1.999 1.735 -13.2 0.002 0.008 337.8 2.079 1.690 -18.7 7.7 3.9 -49.4 1.93 1.63 -15.8
34 Metal products 0.032 1.495 1.466 -1.9 0.011 0.031 182.0 1.947 1.844 -5.3 13.2 4.0 -69.9 1.72 1.77 3.1
35 Ordinary machinery 0.052 1.712 1.713 0.0 0.015 0.065 321.5 2.601 1.655 -36.4 17.5 5.1 -71.0 2.21 1.58 -28.8
36 Special purpose equipment 0.030 1.548 1.430 -7.6 0.008 0.033 298.9 2.491 1.668 -33.0 16.6 5.3 -68.2 2.14 1.58 -25.8
37 Transport equipment 0.076 1.391 1.478 6.2 0.011 0.029 171.1 2.358 2.023 -14.2 43.5 12.7 -70.8 1.64 1.79 9.2
39 Electric equipment & machinery 0.061 1.569 1.656 5.5 0.009 0.030 253.1 1.718 1.598 -7.0 11.3 3.0 -73.0 1.54 1.55 0.4
40
Electronic & telecommunications 
equipment
0.121 1.390 1.362 -2.0 0.004 0.013 225.0 2.087 1.628 -22.0 13.5 1.3 -90.5 1.84 1.61 -12.6
41
Instruments, meters, cultural & office 
equipment
0.013 1.279 1.416 10.7 0.003 0.009 206.5 2.035 1.677 -17.6 15.7 4.3 -72.6 1.76 1.61 -8.6
42 Other manufacturing 0.009 1.223 1.459 19.3 0.004 0.012 178.7 2.303 1.811 -21.4 8.8 2.8 -67.8 2.12 1.76 -16.8
Mean 0.034 1.56 1.53 -0.83 0.01 0.02 190.65 2.60 2.15 -15.30 15.64 5.74 -61.87 2.24 2.02 -7.47
Standard 
deviation
0.029 0.24 0.25 14.08 0.01 0.02 84.26 1.03 0.82 14.11 9.12 3.66 17.25 0.80 0.74 16.09
Max 0.121 2.41 2.41 40.41 0.02 0.06 337.82 5.37 5.39 15.91 43.46 16.57 -14.99 4.29 4.91 26.33
Min 0.007 1.22 1.28 -19.41 0.00 0.00 -10.84 1.71 1.51 -47.96 4.08 0.87 -90.54 1.47 1.44 -44.55
γ
Table 11A: Estimation Result in Multi-Sector Model (Part A)
τ Tariff Non-tariff τσPre-determined
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cic2d Industry definition 1995 2004 % change 1995 2004 % change 1995 2004 % change 1995 2004 % change 1995 2004 % change
13 Food processing 3.141 3.450 9.8 6.276 7.372 17.5 -2.367 -1.644 30.5 0.348 0.458 31.4 0.308 0.407 32.2
14 Food manufacturing 3.413 3.416 0.1 4.082 4.620 13.2 -1.808 -1.499 17.1 0.142 0.347 143.6 0.356 0.402 12.8
15 Beverage manufacturing 3.583 3.679 2.7 5.802 4.366 -24.7 -0.961 -1.254 -30.5 0.093 0.260 180.3 0.070 0.189 171.5
16 Tobacco processing 2.504 3.467 38.5 6.143 6.243 1.6 -1.902 -1.339 29.6 0.355 0.454 27.9 0.217 0.196 -9.3
17 Textile industry 3.009 3.248 8.0 5.205 5.323 2.3 -2.280 -1.762 22.7 0.282 0.335 19.1 0.342 0.138 -59.5
18 Garments & other fiber products 3.633 3.510 -3.4 4.820 6.704 39.1 -2.168 -0.920 57.6 0.510 0.437 -14.3 0.091 0.450 393.4
19 Leather, furs, down & related products 2.829 3.503 23.8 5.178 4.548 -12.2 -2.179 -1.724 20.9 0.316 0.395 25.0 0.387 0.315 -18.6
20
Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm 
fiber & straw products
2.846 3.028 6.4 5.246 5.543 5.7 -2.425 -1.751 27.8 0.427 0.342 -19.9 0.379 0.231 -39.2
21 Furniture manufacturing 2.793 3.086 10.5 5.130 5.111 -0.4 -1.881 -1.593 15.3 0.257 0.352 36.7 0.291 0.062 -78.5
22 Papermaking & paper products 3.158 2.761 -12.6 5.533 6.092 10.1 -2.211 -1.765 20.2 0.266 0.388 45.6 0.623 0.420 -32.6
23 Printing industry 2.969 2.760 -7.0 6.198 5.600 -9.7 -2.380 -1.769 25.7 0.359 0.435 21.2 0.103 0.179 73.8
24 Cultural, educational & sports goods 2.616 3.479 33.0 5.246 4.629 -11.7 -2.123 -1.707 19.6 0.370 0.451 21.8 0.267 0.176 -34.1
25 Petroleum processing & coking 2.703 2.958 9.4 5.368 6.417 19.5 -2.286 -1.843 19.4 0.168 0.327 94.4 0.291 0.289 -0.8
26
Raw chemical materials & chemical 
products
3.045 2.161 -29.0 4.775 6.112 28.0 -2.507 -1.829 27.0 0.347 0.477 37.4 0.453 0.432 -4.6
27 Medical & pharmaceutical products 2.728 2.658 -2.6 6.473 4.998 -22.8 -2.160 -1.611 25.4 0.474 0.514 8.4 0.136 0.398 192.1
28 Chemical fiber 2.444 2.982 22.0 5.474 3.985 -27.2 -2.570 -1.730 32.7 0.403 0.209 -48.0 0.527 0.446 -15.3
29 Rubber products 3.431 2.607 -24.0 5.798 4.493 -22.5 -2.362 -1.713 27.5 0.269 0.329 22.4 0.118 0.124 5.2
30 Plastic products 3.144 3.142 -0.1 4.860 5.113 5.2 -2.360 -1.643 30.4 0.289 0.315 8.7 0.255 0.260 1.8
31 Nonmetal mineral products 2.858 3.035 6.2 4.919 5.539 12.6 -1.633 -1.388 15.0 0.283 0.293 3.6 0.245 0.357 45.9
32 Smelting & pressing of ferrous metals 3.021 3.536 17.0 7.705 4.388 -43.0 -2.306 -1.512 34.5 0.125 0.124 -1.3 0.291 0.485 66.5
33 Smelting & pressing of nonferrous metals 2.742 2.700 -1.5 5.169 5.512 6.6 -2.472 -1.740 29.6 0.356 0.340 -4.5 0.280 0.297 5.9
34 Metal products 3.099 2.884 -6.9 5.164 5.426 5.1 -2.418 -1.807 25.3 0.361 0.415 15.1 0.232 0.113 -51.4
35 Ordinary machinery 2.238 2.738 22.3 4.639 6.954 49.9 -2.403 -1.744 27.4 0.333 0.421 26.4 0.524 0.378 -27.9
36 Special purpose equipment 2.065 2.326 12.6 5.165 5.608 8.6 -2.512 -1.801 28.3 0.338 0.383 13.5 0.627 0.434 -30.8
37 Transport equipment 2.786 2.863 2.8 6.788 6.257 -7.8 -2.356 -1.687 28.4 0.369 0.387 4.9 0.305 0.313 2.8
39 Electric equipment & machinery 2.803 2.961 5.6 5.796 5.601 -3.4 -2.468 -1.694 31.4 0.338 0.399 18.0 0.189 0.405 114.8
40
Electronic & telecommunications 
equipment
2.414 2.468 2.2 5.545 5.907 6.5 -2.354 -1.738 26.2 0.490 0.570 16.3 0.595 0.455 -23.5
41
Instruments, meters, cultural & office 
equipment
2.389 2.145 -10.2 4.960 5.930 19.6 -2.441 -1.697 30.5 0.538 0.554 2.9 0.600 0.525 -12.5
42 Other manufacturing 2.740 3.544 29.3 5.052 5.829 15.4 -2.251 -1.766 21.6 0.498 0.502 0.9 0.282 0.192 -31.8
Mean 2.87 3.00 5.69 5.47 5.52 2.79 -2.23 -1.64 24.72 0.33 0.39 25.43 0.32 0.31 22.35
Standard 
deviation
0.38 0.43 15.56 0.73 0.83 20.05 0.33 0.20 13.21 0.11 0.10 45.17 0.16 0.13 95.11
Max 3.63 3.68 38.48 7.70 7.37 49.91 -0.96 -0.92 57.56 0.54 0.57 180.33 0.63 0.53 393.41
Min 2.06 2.15 -29.02 4.08 3.98 -43.05 -2.57 -1.84 -30.51 0.09 0.12 -48.03 0.07 0.06 -78.54
Table 11B: Estimation Result in Multi-Sector Model (Part B)
λ_1 λ_2 μ_1 η_1 η_2
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Dependent 
variable Fixed Effect R-Squared
SOE share
R&D 
expenditure
Capital 
intensity
Capital 
distortion
λ_1 0.483 -0.132*** -0.160* -0.000525** Year 0.258
(0.301) (0.0325) (0.0813) (0.000251)
λ_1 0.657 -0.529* -0.210** -0.000655* Year and Sector 0.799
(0.437) (0.275) (0.0750) (0.000361)
Table 12: Entry Frictions and λ_1 Estimates
Indicators of Entry Frictions
Notes: As there are two years and 29 manufacturing sectors, the number of observations is 58. Robust 
standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. R&D expenditure and 
the capital intensity (measured by capital labor ratio) are both in logarithms.
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Total Welfare W_Prod W_A W_R W_A and W_R W_A
% change from τ at 
1995 to τ at 2004  
4.5% 3.5% 0.8% 0.1% 21.0% 18.5%
% change from 
autarky to τ at 2004
21.7% 16.5% 4.6% -0.1% 20.9% 21.3%
Notes: Similar to Table 4, all the analyses in Panel A are done under 2004 estimates, and only the trade costs change. The 
reported percentage changes in this panel are under the changes from the corresponding τ to 2004's.
Table 13: Counter-factual Analysis in Multiple-Sector Economy
Welfare Contribution to total welfare 
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Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sectoral markup at 
1995
-1.315** -1.065 -1.629* -1.670* -0.475*** -0.491*** -0.700*** -0.700***
(0.590) (0.663) (0.903) (0.927) (0.147) (0.161) (0.238) (0.241)
SOE share 0.244* -0.709 -0.0202 -0.00429
(0.127) (0.752) (0.0261) (0.149)
Log wage at 1995 -0.106 -0.102 -0.0903 -0.0905
(0.201) (0.202) (0.0617) (0.0646)
Log employment at 
1995
-0.144 -0.289 -0.0388 -0.0398
(0.124) (0.234) (0.0307) (0.0538)
Log export at 1995 0.160*** 0.174** -0.0429*** -0.0427**
(0.0560) (0.0697) (0.0142) (0.0153)
Log import at 1995 -0.0122 0.0559 0.0490*** 0.0494**
(0.0531) (0.111) (0.0174) (0.0235)
R2 0.076 0.101 0.289 0.334 0.203 0.206 0.463 0.463
Table 14: Did China Liberalize the Right Sectors?
Changes in trade costs between 1995 and 2004 Changes in import tariffs between 1995 and 2004
Notes : The regression is weighted by sectoral trade volume and sectoral imports when the dependent variable is the change in 
trade cost and import tariff, respectively. Note that the sample size is small (29), and hence one should use caution when 
interpreting the significance levels.* Significant at the 10 percent level.** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at 
the 1 percent level. 
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Industry Median IQR Median IQR Median IQR Median IQR Median IQR Obs.
Food processing 0.09 [0.07,0.13] 0.03 [0.01,0.05] 0.86 [0.81,0.90] 0.99 [0.98,1.00] 0.99 [0.98,1.00] 104,518
Food manufacturing 0.14 [0.11,0.18] 0.05 [0.02,0.08] 0.82 [0.76,0.87] 1.02 [1.00,1.04] 1.03 [1.00,1.04] 48,295
Beverage manufacturing 0.19 [0.14,0.25] 0.02 [-0.01,0.05] 0.78 [0.71,0.84] 1.01 [0.97,1.04] 1.01 [0.98,1.04] 41,894
Tobacco processing 0.17 [0.03,0.33] 0.24 [0.10,0.35] 0.73 [0.64,0.82] 1.14 [1.05,1.23] 1.14 [1.04,1.22] 731
Textile industry 0.16 [0.11,0.22] 0.04 [0.03,0.05] 0.84 [0.77,0.89] 1.03 [0.99,1.06] 1.02 [0.99,1.05] 113,001
Garments and other fiber products 0.23 [0.15,0.35] 0.05 [0.04,0.07] 0.75 [0.64,0.84] 1.02 [1.00,1.05] 1.02 [1.00,1.05] 72,381
Leather, furs, down and related products 0.20 [0.12,0.28] 0.01 [0.00,0.02] 0.81 [0.73,0.88] 1.01 [1.00,1.03] 1.01 [1.00,1.03] 34,655
Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm fiber and 
straw products
0.15 [0.10,0.21] 0.03 [0.03,0.04] 0.83 [0.76,0.88] 1.01 [0.99,1.02] 1.00 [0.99,1.02] 57,283
Furniture manufacturing 0.38 [0.33,0.44] -0.02 [-0.03,0.00] 0.99 [0.90,1.07] 1.37 [1.30,1.44] 1.38 [1.32,1.46] 34,126
Papermaking and paper products 0.26 [0.23,0.29] 0.05 [0.04,0.06] 0.85 [0.80,0.89] 1.15 [1.13,1.19] 1.16 [1.13,1.20] 55,606
Printing industry 0.24 [0.21,0.26] 0.11 [0.08,0.15] 0.86 [0.77,0.94] 1.24 [1.17,1.29] 1.25 [1.18,1.30] 57,993
Cultural, educational and sports goods 0.23 [0.15,0.34] 0.06 [0.05,0.08] 0.79 [0.70,0.86] 1.07 [1.04,1.11] 1.06 [1.04,1.10] 20,987
Petroleum processing and coking 0.10 [0.07,0.14] 0.06 [0.05,0.07] 0.83 [0.78,0.87] 0.99 [0.98,1.00] 0.99 [0.98,1.00] 10,430
Raw chemical materials and chemical products 0.22 [0.18,0.25] 0.04 [0.03,0.05] 0.72 [0.67,0.76] 0.97 [0.96,0.97] 0.96 [0.96,0.97] 108,197
Medical and pharmaceutical products 0.25 [0.18,0.32] 0.19 [0.13,0.26] 0.65 [0.55,0.74] 1.08 [1.04,1.12] 1.08 [1.04,1.11] 17,595
Chemical fiber 0.05 [0.01,0.09] 0.16 [0.15,0.18] 0.73 [0.69,0.76] 0.94 [0.92,0.95] 0.94 [0.92,0.95] 4,925
Rubber products 0.23 [0.19,0.27] 0.06 [0.06,0.07] 0.79 [0.73,0.83] 1.08 [1.06,1.09] 1.07 [1.06,1.09] 20,664
Plastic products 0.14 [0.09,0.19] 0.06 [0.05,0.07] 0.83 [0.77,0.88] 1.01 [1.00,1.03] 1.01 [1.00,1.03] 92,509
Nonmetal mineral products 0.15 [0.09,0.22] 0.05 [0.04,0.06] 0.80 [0.72,0.86] 0.98 [0.97,1.01] 0.98 [0.97,1.00] 226,792
Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals 0.10 [0.07,0.14] 0.03 [0.03,0.04] 0.85 [0.80,0.90] 0.98 [0.97,0.99] 0.98 [0.97,0.99] 29,102
Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals 0.12 [0.08,0.16] 0.03 [0.03,0.04] 0.84 [0.79,0.88] 0.99 [0.99,1.00] 0.99 [0.99,1.00] 20,671
Metal products 0.17 [0.13,0.23] 0.09 [0.08,0.11] 0.71 [0.66,0.76] 0.97 [0.96,1.00] 0.97 [0.95,0.99] 117,081
Ordinary machinery 0.20 [0.16,0.26] 0.08 [0.06,0.09] 0.80 [0.73,0.85] 1.07 [1.06,1.09] 1.07 [1.06,1.08] 148,586
Special purpose equipment 0.24 [0.22,0.28] 0.08 [0.06,0.10] 0.79 [0.73,0.85] 1.13 [1.09,1.16] 1.13 [1.10,1.16] 77,157
Transport equipment 0.16 [0.11,0.22] 0.07 [0.06,0.09] 0.76 [0.69,0.82] 0.99 [0.99,1.00] 0.99 [0.98,1.00] 75,943
Electric equipment and machinery 0.15 [0.11,0.21] 0.06 [0.05,0.07] 0.79 [0.73,0.84] 1.00 [0.99,1.01] 1.00 [0.99,1.01] 63,631
Electronic and telecommunications equipment 0.23 [0.17,0.30] 0.10 [0.09,0.11] 0.73 [0.65,0.80] 1.06 [1.05,1.08] 1.06 [1.05,1.08] 48,716
Instruments, meters, cultural and office equipment 0.20 [0.13,0.29] 0.09 [0.07,0.10] 0.72 [0.63,0.79] 1.00 [0.97,1.04] 1.00 [0.96,1.03] 25,494
Other manufacturing 0.21 [0.14,0.29] 0.06 [0.04,0.07] 0.78 [0.70,0.84] 1.02 [1.00,1.06] 1.02 [1.00,1.05] 39,978
Table A1: Production Function Estimates
Panel A: Output Elasticity With Respect to … Panel B: Returns to Scale
Materials
Notes: IQR means inter-quartile range. In Panel B, we calculate the r in k^rY=F(kK,kL,kM), where Y,K,L,M are output, capital, labor, and material, respectively. The calculation is local to 
the data values and our estimate. The columns under "double" and "triple" are the results when k is chosen to be 2 and 3, respectively. 
Double TripleLabor Capital
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Predetermined
w Relative wages (the ROW to China)
R1 China's manufacturing sales ($b)
R2 ROW's manufacturing sales ($b)
Moments for SMM Data Model Data Model
import share 0.130 0.137 0.222 0.235
export share 0.153 0.181 0.249 0.293
relative number of firms 0.210 0.197 0.596 0.601
fraction of exporters 0.044 0.025 0.105 0.066
mean cost share for exporters 0.845 0.799 0.801 0.790
std  of cost share for exporters 0.135 0.142 0.142 0.137
p50 markup for exporters 1.196 1.217 1.168 1.223
p95 markup for exporters 2.199 2.169 2.183 2.115
3.299 3.176 3.364 3.317
mean cost share for non-exporters 0.789 0.737 0.829 0.763
std of cost share for non-exporters 0.147 0.178 0.139 0.161
p50  markup for non-exporters 1.266 1.334 1.213 1.285
p95  markup for non-exporters 2.475 2.558 2.400 2.196
3.537 3.176 3.523 2.740
Estimates s.e. Estimates s.e. 
2.337 0.024 1.782 0.009
0.187 0.001 0.643 0.003
2.985 0.058 2.710 0.028
5.508 0.148 5.024 0.043
-2.391 0.037 -1.751 0.015
0.450 0.008 0.425 0.003
0.437 0.012 0.357 0.012
1.459 0.004 1.432 0.002
Simulated R2/R1 Data Model Data Model
R2/R1 10.234 9.388 6.289 5.704
Notes: All units, if any, are in billions USD, current price. The import share is the import penetration ratio, i.e. IM/(R1-EX+IM), 
and the export share is the total export divided by the same denominator. All the cost share moments are weighted by firms' 
revenues. Recall that a firm's cost share is the inverse of its markup. p# denotes the #-th percentile.
γ/   , measure of goods relative to 
λ_1, Poisson parameter, China
λ_2, Poisson parameter, ROW
μ_1, mean of log productivity, China relative to ROW
η_1, std of log productivity, China
η_2, std of log productivity, ROW
σ, elasticity of substitution
τ, trade cost
Table A2: SMM Results in the Model with Trade Imbalance
1995 2004
10.25 5.18
918,291 2,343,328
9,397,500 14,737,500
Parameter values
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Predetermined
w Relative wages (the ROW to China)
R1 China's manufacturing sales ($b)
R2 ROW's manufacturing sales ($b)
Moments for SMM Data Model Data Model
import share 0.073 0.077 0.135 0.150
export share 0.096 0.111 0.162 0.185
relative number of firms 0.210 0.177 0.596 0.586
fraction of exporters 0.044 0.018 0.105 0.039
mean cost share for exporters 0.845 0.802 0.801 0.788
std of cost share for exporters 0.135 0.148 0.142 0.136
p50 markup for exporters 1.196 1.213 1.168 1.226
p95 markup for exporters 2.199 2.695 2.183 2.286
p99 markup for exporters 3.299 2.695 3.364 3.218
mean cost share for non-exporters 0.789 0.746 0.829 0.741
std of cost share for non-exporters 0.147 0.176 0.139 0.173
p50 markup for non-exporters 1.266 1.332 1.213 1.327
p95 markup for non-exporters 2.475 2.695 2.400 2.440
p99 markup for non-exporters 3.537 2.695 3.523 3.218
Estimates s.e. Estimates s.e. 
2.674 0.052 2.036 0.014
0.215 0.001 0.563 0.002
2.784 0.114 2.667 0.038
4.924 0.062 4.982 0.018
-2.389 0.037 -1.735 0.010
0.434 0.014 0.425 0.002
0.399 0.017 0.321 0.015
1.729 0.005 1.451 0.003
Simulated R2/R1 Data Model Data Model
R2/R1 10.234 7.874 6.289 5.091
918,291 2,343,328
Table A3: SMM Results when Processing Trade is Considered
1995 2004
10.25 5.18
Notes: All units, if any, are in billions USD, current price. The import share is the import penetration ratio, i.e. IM/(R1-
EX+IM), and the export share is the total export divided by the same denominator. All the cost share moments are 
weighted by firms' revenues. Recall that a firm's cost share is the inverse of its markup. p# denotes the #-th percentile.
9,397,500 14,737,500
Parameter values
τ, trade cost
γ/   , measure of goods relative to 
λ_1, Poisson parameter, China
λ_2, Poisson parameter, ROW
μ_1, mean of log productivity, China relative to ROW
η_1, std of log productivity, China
η_2, std of log productivity, ROW
σ, elasticity of substitution
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